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A FATHER'S RIGHT TO KNOW HIS CHILD:
CAN IT BE DENIED SIMPLY BECAUSE THE
MOTHER MARRIED ANOTHER MAN?
Ann Minnick Wheeler*
I. INTRODUCTION
The laws of most states provide that a child born to a married wo-
man is presumed to be the legitimate child of the mother's husband at the
time the child is born.' Under those laws, this presumption of legitimacy
may be rebutted by proof that the mother's husband is not the child's
biological father.2 However, state laws vary as to what persons are enti-
tled to rebut the presumption.3 In a significant number of states, the
biological father has been denied the right to rebut the presumption of
* Associate Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, San Diego. Formerly
an associate attorney with Lord, Day & Lord, New York, and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los
Angeles. B.A. 1971, College of William and Mary; J.D. 1977, University of Virginia.
1. The presumption of legitimacy began as a maxim of ancient Roman law and was later
adopted by the English common law from which the rule was derived in the United States.
Most states still have laws which embody a strong presumption of legitimacy. See infra notes
72-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the presumption of legitimacy and the state
interests asserted to support such a presumption.
2. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 16-17 (1971).
3. See Annotation, Who May Dispute Presumption of Legitimacy of Child Conceived or
Born During Wedlock, 90 A.L.R. 3D 1032 (1979). In a number of states, the mother and the
presumed father (and sometimes the child) are given standing to rebut the presumption, but
the biological father of the child is not given this right. For example, the Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA) provides that a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he and the
child's natural mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1), 9A U.L.A. 590 (1979). See infra Appendix for
full text of relevant provisions of the UPA. This presumption may be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence and a court decree establishing paternity in another man. Id. § 4(b), 9A
U.L.A. 591. However, only certain persons, namely the child, his natural mother and the man
presumed to be the child's father, are given standing to rebut the presumption under the terms
of the Act. Id. § 6(a), 9A U.L.A. 593. The Act makes no provision for a man claiming to be
the natural father of a child to bring an action to establish paternity when another man is the
presumed father of the child. In spite of the fact that the Act explicitly states that marital
status is irrelevant in the establishment of a parent and child relationship, the UPA gives the
biological father no right to establish a legal relationship with his child if the child's mother is
married to another man at the time of the birth. See id. § 2, 9A U.L.A. 588.
Sixteen states have adopted the UPA, with each state having adopted its own modified
version of the Act. 9A U.L.A. 352 (Supp. 1986). Some of these states have modified § 6 of the
UPA to explicitly allow a biological father the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.
See, e.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 584-6 (1976); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060 (1986).
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legitimacy, even though the presumed father, the mother, and sometimes
the child, have been given this right.
When a biological father is denied the right to rebut the presump-
tion of legitimacy, the father is thereby foreclosed from establishing his
paternity.4 If the father cannot establish his paternity, he is denied all
legal rights in regard to his child. He has no legally enforceable right of
custody or visitation, and therefore may have no opportunity to develop
a relationship with his child.
Where a statute is construed to deny all biological fathers the right
to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, the biological father is denied the
opportunity to a legal relationship with his child without consideration
of the facts of his particular case. For example, if an unmarried woman
becomes pregnant, and then, prior to the child's birth, marries a man
other than the biological father, the biological father is by operation of
such statute precluded from establishing any legal rights with respect to
his child. Thus, the mother's unilateral action of marrying another man
cuts off the biological father's rights to his child, even though the father
may desire to know, nurture, love and support his child.5 On the other
hand, since many states allow the mother to rebut the presumption of
4. The issue of whether a biological father should be given the right to rebut the presump-
tion of legitimacy may arise in a number of proceedings, including paternity, custody and
visitation suits. See Matts, Unwed Fathers. Is Arizona Denying Their Right to Recognition as
Parents?, 26 ARiz. L. REv. 143 (1984). That article describes the various state procedures by
which a natural father may establish his paternity. It groups these procedures into four
classes, according to the method provided for conferring upon the father standing to assert his
parental rights. Id. at 149-50.
In some proceedings a court may deny a biological father the right to rebut the presump-
tion of legitimacy as a result of statutory construction. For example, in states that have
adopted paternity statutes with provisions such as those of the UPA described in note 3, supra,
the statutes explicitly specify those persons entitled to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. If
the biological father is not included in the list of those entitled to rebut the presumption, a
court may construe the statute to provide that the biological father does not have standing to
rebut the presumption. Id. at 151-52.
In states where there is no statute specifying who may rebut the presumption of legiti-
macy, the issue of whether a biological father has standing to rebut the presumption arises in
various proceedings brought by the biological father to establish his paternity or assert other
rights regarding his child. For example, in states which provide statutory procedures by which
unwed fathers may legitimate their children simply by assertion or acknowledgment, biological
fathers may raise the standing issue in custody or visitation suits. The court must then decide
whether or not the alleged father has a right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy because
the alleged father's paternity must be established before the court can decide the ultimate issue
of custody or visitation rights. In these cases, some courts have allowed the alleged father the
right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy by clear and convincing evidence of his paternity,
while others have denied the father this right. Id. at 154.
5. This hypothetical situation is very similar to the facts of A v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d
1222 (Wyo.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982), discussed infra notes 106-16 and accompany-
ing text.
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legitimacy and establish paternity in the biological father,6 she may force
upon the biological father legal obligations relating to the child.
The denial of the right of a biological father to rebut the presump-
tion of legitimacy raises several constitutional issues. Does a biological
father have a constitutionally protected right to an opportunity to de-
velop a relationship with his child? If the father has such an interest,
may a state nevertheless constitutionally deny all biological fathers the
right to rebut the presumption on the basis of the state interests of pro-
tecting the child and/or the family created by the child, the mother and
her husband? Even if these asserted state interests are deemed sufficient
to justify denying a biological father a right to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy, may such statutes be upheld when they give the biological
mother the right to rebut the same presumption?
These questions require an examination of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to determine whether
denying a biological father the right to rebut the presumption of legiti-
macy violates these constitutional guarantees. The United States
Supreme Court has not rendered an opinion concerning this issue.7
However, several state supreme courts have recently addressed the con-
stitutionality of such statutes and these courts have been divided on the
issue.
This Article analyzes the constitional issues raised by statutes which
are construed to deny standing to the biological father to rebut the pre-
sumption of legitimacy, and therefore deny him the right to establish his
paternity. It focuses first on whether such statutes violate the due pro-
6. See, eg., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6(a)(2), 9A U.L.A. 593 (1979) (giving the natural
mother the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy and the right to establish paternity in
the biological father). See infra Appendix for the full text of these provisions of the UPA.
7. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in three cases which deal with this
issue. A v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982). See infra
notes 106-16 and accompanying text. In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 475, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1014, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 885 (1975). See infra notes 127-
41 and accompanying text; P.B.C. v. D.H., 396 Mass. 68, 483 N.E.2d 1094 (1985), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 1286 (1986); see also infra notes 165, 195, 221.
In another case, the Court dismissed an appeal by the biological father on the grounds of
lack of a substantial federal question. However, Justice White and Justice Stevens noted prob-
able jurisdiction in that case and would have set the case for oral argument. Michelle W. v.
Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S.
Ct. 774 (1986). See infra notes 142-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Michelle W.
See also Vincent B. v. Joan R., 126 Cal. App. 3d 619, 179 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1981), appeal dismissed,
459 U.S. 807 (1982) (dismissed for want of a substantial federal question).
8. See, eg., X, Y and Z 641 P.2d 1222 (statute constitutional); R. McG. v. J.W., 200
Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980) (statute unconstitutional). See infra notes 106-16, 247-52 and
accompanying text.
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cess clause of the fourteenth amendment. It then considers whether stat-
utes which deny a biological father the right to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy, while giving the mother this right, violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.
II. DUE PROCESS
A statute which is construed to deny all biological fathers the right
to rebut the presumption of legitimacy may be challenged on the basis
that it denies such a father the right to due process of law.9 Such a stat-
ute may be deemed to violate due process if it prohibits a biological fa-
ther from establishing legal rights vis-a-vis his child without a showing
that the state interests supporting the statute outweigh the biological fa-
ther's private interests. ° Such a statute would arguably violate the bio-
logical father's right to procedural due process.11
Before a statute may violate an individual's rights under the due
process clause, it must first be determined that the individual has an in-
terest worthy of constitutional protection. 12 If an individual has an inter-
est which is protected by the due process clause, it is then necessary to
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
10. See infra notes 101-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the balancing process
employed to determine whether a particular statute violates due process.
11. Although an argument may also be made that such a statute violates substantive due
process, this argument would be weak, and therefore this Article does not address issues re-
garding substantive due process. Unless it could be established that the biological father's
interest is a fundamental interest, the statute would be presumed valid and would only be
deemed to violate substantive due process if it bore no relationship to the asserted ends of the
legislation. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986) (community morality no-
tions provide "rational basis" to sustain law). Clearly, the statute in question would be upheld
under this standard. Therefore, in order to illustrate that such a statute violates substantive
due process, a showing is required that a biological father's right to a relationship with his
child implicates a fundamental interest. If a fundamental interest is implicated, the statute will
be deemed to violate due process unless the state shows that the regulation serves some com-
pelling state interest, and that there is no less restrictive alternative for serving that interest.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
Although this would be a difficult showing for the state to make, it would also be very
difficult for the biological father in such cases to show that he has a fundamental right to a
relationship with his child. United States Supreme Court cases regarding the rights of biologi-
cal fathers of illegitimate children, discussed infra at notes 20-59 and accompanying text, have
indicated that the nature of a biological father's interest in his child varies depending on the
facts of the individual case. Therefore, it would be difficult to categorize the interest of all
biological fathers as a fundamental interest worthy of substantive due process protection.
Another argument which might be made is that the statute violates due process guaran-
tees under the "doctrine of irrebutable presumptions." See infra note 21.
12. In analyzing a procedural due process question, the Supreme Court has indicated that
there are two issues which should be considered separately. These issues are: (1) what depri-
vation of personal interests by the government warrant due process protection, and (2) what
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determine what process must be accorded that person before he may be
denied that interest.13
Accordingly, in analyzing a biological father's due process rights,
the first issue which must be addressed is whether a biological father in
such circumstances has any interest which should be deemed worthy of
protection under this constitutional provision. Once it is determined that
a biological father has such a constitutionally cognizable interest, it is
then necessary to evaluate both the biological father's interest and the
state interests to determine what type of procedure would best meet the
parameters of the due process clause.
A. The Father's Interest
In addressing the issue of whether a biological father has any inter-
est worthy of protection under the due process clause,14 the relevant
question is whether all biological fathers have a constitutionally cogniza-
ble interest in an opportunity to establish paternity. Four United States
Supreme Court decisions support the view that a biological father has
such a constitutionally cognizable interest. 5 Since all of these cases con-
cern a biological father's interest in a child born to an unmarried woman,
they do not explicitly address a biological father's right to rebut the pre-
sumption of legitimacy. 6 However, these cases suggest that every bio-
logical father has an opportunity interest in a relationship with his
offspring, regardless of the marital status of the mother at the time of the
child's birth.17 Thus, these cases are not only important in considering
process is due. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-12, at 532-33 (1978).
This Article treats these issues separately.
13. Id.
14. In order to find an interest worthy of protection under the due process clause, the
Supreme Court has indicated that it is necessary to find a "liberty" or "property" interest
which is being threatened by government action. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
262 (1970) (Court found welfare entitlements may be protectible "property" interest). For a
general discussion of the kinds of interests which have been deemed constitutionally cognizable
interests in "liberty" or "property," see L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 10-8 to § 10-11, at 506-32
(1978).
15. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972).
16. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has not issued an opinion regarding a biologi-
cal father's interest in a relationship with his child when his child was born while the mother
was married to another man. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 20-66 and accompanying text. These cases represent a departure from
the traditional view that a father's rights with respect to his child are dependent on the marital
status of the mother at the time of his child's birth. Traditionally, under our legal system, if
the mother of a child was married to the child's biological father at the time of the child's
birth, the child was presumed to be the legitimate child of the biological father. Therefore, the
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the interests of biological fathers in their illegitimate children,18 but are
also important in determining a biological father's interest in a relation-
ship with his child when his child is born while the mother is married to
another man. 19
1. Review of United States Supreme Court decisions
a. Stanley v. Illinois
In Stanley v. Illinois,20 the United States Supreme Court first recog-
biological father had rights of custody and control of the child and had a duty to support the
child.
If, on the other hand, the mother of the child was unmarried at the time of the child's
birth, the child was deemed illegitimate. Under the common law, an illegitimate child was
consideredfilius nullius or the "child of no man," and, therefore, the biological father had no
legal rights with respect to the child. A biological father also had no rights with respect to the
child if the child's mother was married to someone other than the biological father at the time
of the child's birth. Since the child was presumed to be the legitimate child of the mother's
husband, only the mother's husband would have the legal rights and responsibilities of father-
hood. See generally H. KRAUSE, supra note 2.
18. Much has been written about the effect of these cases upon the constitutional rights of
fathers of illegitimate children. See Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers
Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 313 (1984); Freytag, Equal Protection
and The Putative Father An Analysis of Parham v. Hughes And Caban v. Mohammed, 34
Sw. L.J. 717 (1980); Weinhaus, Substantive Rights of the Unwed Father: The Boundaries Are
Defined, 19 3. FAM. L. 445 (1980-81); Comment, Caban v. Mohammed: Extending the Rights
of Unwed Fathers, 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 95 (1979); Note, Limiting the Boundaries of Stanley
v. Illinois: Caban v. Mohammed, 57 DEN. L.J 671 (1980); Note, Constitutional Law-Equal
Protection--Caban v. Mohammed, 29 EMORY L.J. 833 (1980); Note, Putative Fathers: Unwed,
But No Longer Unprotected, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 425 (1980); Comment, Domestic Relations -
Parental Rights of the Putative Father: Equal Protection and Due Process Considerations, 14
MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 259 (1984); Note, Adoption: The Rights of the Putative Father, 37 OKLA.
L. REV. 583 (1984); Note, Delineation of the Boundaries of Putative Fathers' Rights A Psycho-
logical Parenthood Perspective, 15 SETON HALL L. REv. 290 (1985); Note, The Rights of Fa-
thers of Non-Marital Children to Custody, Visitation and to Consent to Adoption, 12 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 412 (1979); Note, Unwed Fathers. An Analytical Survey of Their Parental
Rights and Obligations, 57 WASH. U.L.Q. 1029 (1979) [hereinafter Unwed Fathers]; Develop-
ments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156 (1980); Supreme
Court Review: 1978-79 Term--Caban v. Mohammed, Parham v. Hughes, 7 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 445, 459 (1980).
19. For the purposes of this Article, the discussion of these cases will be limited to what
they suggest concerning the interest of every biological father in an opportunity to establish his
paternity and develop a relationship with his child.
20. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Before Stanley was decided, the Supreme Court had already
accorded constitutional protection to the family relationship. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 533 (1953) (right to care, custody, management, and companionship of children held
more precious than property rights); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (pri-
mary parental right to custody, care, and nurture of children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (basic civil rights to marry and procreate); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534 (1925) (right of parents to direct upbringing and education of their children).
In addition, the Court had previously extended constitutional protection to interests aris-
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nized a biological father's constitutional right to a legal relationship with
his illegitimate child. In this case, the Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment entitled the biological father to a
hearing on his fitness before his illegitimate children could be removed
from his custody. 1 In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized
that the father in this case had an interest deserving of protection under
the due process clause.
The father's interest, as the Court expressed it, was "the private in-
terest.., of a man in the children he has sired and raised," and also "the
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and manage-
ment of his or her children. 22 Thus, the language of the Court was
ing out of mother-illegitimate child relationships. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72
(1968) (holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting filing of wrongful death actions by ille-
gitimate children for death of their mother); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391
U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968) (declaring unconstitutional a statute denying unwed mother the right to
bring wrongful death action upon the loss of her illegitimate child).
21. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. The Court in Stanley struck down the irrebuttable statutory
presumption that all unmarried fathers were unfit to raise their children. The Court stated:
It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and
neglectful parents. It may also be that Stanley is such a parent and that his children
should be placed in other hands. But all unmarried fathers are not in this category;
some are wholly suited to have custody of their children.
Id. at 654 (footnote omitted).
Thus, Stanley has been cited as an important case representing the Supreme Court's appli-
cation of the "doctrine of irrebuttable presumptions." See, eg., Prygoski, When a Hearing is
Not a Hearing: Irrebuttable Presumptions and Termination of Parental Rights Based on Status,
44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 879, 905-06 (1983). The Supreme Court has applied this doctrine in a
number of other cases. See, ag., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). One commentator described this doctrine in the follow-
ing manner:
When a statutory provision imposes a burden upon a class of individuals for a partic-
ular purpose and certain individuals within the burdened class are so situated that
burdening them does not further that purpose, then the rigid statutory classification
must be replaced, to the extent administratively feasible, by an individual factual
determination that more accurately selects the individuals who are to bear the statu-
tory burden.
Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 800, 800 (1974).
It should be noted that an argument may be made that this doctrine is an appropriate
method of attacking a presumption of legitimacy which is conclusive as to all biological fa-
thers. However, the text of this Article does not deal with this doctrine for two reasons. First,
the theoretical basis of the doctrine is unclear, and the Supreme Court appears to be employing
this doctrine with declining frequency. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 554 (2d ed 1983) [hereinafter NOWAK]. Second, the results which would be
reached through the use of this doctrine may be reached through the use of the principles of
equal protection and procedural due process which are discussed in this Article. See Prygoski,
supra, at 920-21.
22. NOWAK, supra note 21, at 651. Peter Stanley lived with the mother of his three chil-
dren intermittently for 18 years. After the children's mother died, the State of Illinois insti-
tuted dependency proceedings to make the children wards of the state. Stanley contended that
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somewhat ambiguous as to the nature and extent of the constitutionally
protectible interest of a biological father in regard to his illegitimate chil-
dren. The Court's decision could be interpreted to mean that all biologi-
cal fathers of illegitimate children have an interest deserving of
protection under the due process clause; or it could be interpreted to
mean that due process protection extends only to those unwed fathers
who have participated in some way in the "raising" of their children.23
The Supreme Court has decided three cases since Stanley which
have helped clarify the nature and extent of a biological father's due pro-
cess interests concerning his illegitimate child.24 Whereas in Stanley the
biological father had custody of his children, these three subsequent cases
concern the right of a non-custodial biological father to maintain a rela-
tionship with his illegitimate child. Each case deals with the non-custo-
dial father's right to contest his child's adoption by the mother's
husband. The adoption would have the effect of severing all of the bio-
logical father's rights with respect to his child.
b. Quilloin v. Walcott
In Quilloin v. Walcott,25 the biological father of an illegitimate child
sought to prevent his son's adoption by the mother's spouse while also
seeking to establish his own paternity. 6 The biological father had not
previously sought actual or legal custody of the child and had only inter-
mittently visited the child over an eleven-year period. The Supreme
Court held that, under these circumstances, where the father had never
assumed any significant responsibility for the supervision, education, pro-
tection or care of his child, it did not violate the biological father's due
process rights to allow the adoption over his objections.2 7 The Court
stated that the due process clause did not require the state to find any-
thing more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the
his children should not be removed from his custody unless the state could show that he was
an unfit parent. Id. at 646-47.
23. See Unwed Fathers, supra note 18.
24. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
25. 434 U.S. 246, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
26. Id. at 247. The Georgia statute required only the consent of the mother for adoption
of the child unless the natural father had legitimated the child. Id. at 248 n.3. Upon notifica-
tion of the adoption petition, the biological father filed an application for a writ of habeas
corpus to obtain visitation rights, a petition for legitimation, and an objection to the adoption.
He later amended his pleadings to challenge the constitutionality of the state statute under the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 250-52.
27. Id. at 256.
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"'best interests of the child.' ,28
The Quilloin case thus indicated that the extent of a biological fa-
ther's rights pertaining to his child depends on the father's assumption of
a significant degree of responsibility for the care and nurturing of the
child.29 When a father, as in Quilloin, has not assumed such responsibil-
ity for his child, his interest may not be great enough to outweigh the
asserted state interests underlying the statute. Thus, the Quilloin Court
held that the father's rights were outweighed by the state's interest in the
welfare of the child.30 Although Quilloin indicated that a father's rela-
tionship with his child may affect the weight accorded his interest, it
nevertheless suggested that even a biological father who has not had a
significant relationship with his child has a substantive interest which is
deserving of protection under the due process clause.
31
In addition, the language of the opinion may be construed to suggest
that the due process clause requires a hearing in every case to determine
whether the biological father's interest in those circumstances is out-
weighed by the asserted state interests.32 The Quilloin Court specifically
noted that the father was given a hearing at which he was afforded the
opportunity to present proof of his fitness.33 Although the Court did not
state whether such a hearing was constitutionally required, it relied upon
28. Id. at 255. The Court also noted that the adoption would "give full recognition to a
family unit already in existence." Id.
29. Indeed, the Supreme Court suggests that if the father had been a custodial father, the
state would have been required to prove the father unfit before the adoption could be allowed
over his objection. The Court stated:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[i]f a State were
to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents
and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to
do so was thought to be in the children's best interest."
Id. (citation omitted).
30. The interest asserted by the state to support the statute was the "best interests of [the]
child." Id. at 251.
31. In Quilloin, the Court expressly recognized substantive due process rights in the bio-
logical father, even though it held those rights were not impermissibly burdened by the state's
application of a "best interests of the child" standard in this case. Id. at 254. In discussing the
father's due process claim, the Court stated:
[w]e have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent
and child is constitutionally protected .... "It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."
... And it is now firmly established that "freedom of personal choice in matters of
... family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 255 (citations omitted).
32. See Unwed Fathers, supra note 18, at 1034, which suggests that Quilloin may be inter-
preted as indicating that due process requires a hearing in all such cases.
33. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253-54.
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the facts of the individual case in weighing the father's interests against
those of the state. The opinion thus suggests that procedural due process
may demand that such hearings be afforded all biological fathers of ille-
gitimate children before termination of their rights in regard to their
children.34
c. Caban v. Mohammed
The next Supreme Court case addressing an unwed father's rights
with respect to his illegitimate child was Caban v. Mohammed.35  In
Caban, the biological father had developed a significant relationship with
his illegitimate children in that he had lived with the children (and their
mother) and had contributed to their support for several years. After he
no longer lived with the children, he continued to maintain contact with
them?
6
When the children's mother and her husband sought to adopt the
children, the father challenged the constitutionality of the New York
statute that denied him the right to veto or consent to the adoption.37
The Court held that under these circumstances, the statute was unconsti-
tutional in that it violated the equal protection clause.38
The father in Caban had also contended that the statute denied him
his due process right to maintain a parental relationship with his children
absent a finding of his unfitness. 39 However, in a footnote, the Court
stated that it "express[ed] no view as to whether a state is constitution-
ally barred from ordering adoption in the absence of a determination that
the parent whose rights are being terminated is unfit."40
Although the Court in Caban expressed no opinion as to the due
process rights of non-custodial unwed fathers, Justice Stevens in his dis-
sent declared that "the relationship between a father and his natural
child [if and when one develops] is entitled to protection against arbitrary
state action as a matter of due process."41 Justice Stevens also stated that
34. Moreover, the Quilloin opinion suggests the kinds of factors which should be consid-
ered in a hearing to determine whether the biological father's rights to a relationship with his
child should prevail. For example, the hearing should consider facts relating to the child's
welfare and facts regarding the existence of a family unit in which the child resides. Id. at 253-
55.
35. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
36. Id. at 382-83.
37. Id. at 385.
38. Id. at 394. The Court held that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated against
unwed fathers who had helped to raise their offspring.
39. Id. at 385.
40. Id. at 394 n.16.
41. Id. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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a state adoption decree might be consistent with due process if supported
by a finding that the adoption will serve the best interests of the child.42
Thus, Justice Stevens suggested that the biological father of an illegiti-
mate child possesses an interest deserving of protection under the due
process clause and that this interest may only be denied by a particular-
ized finding that the state interests outweigh the father's interest under
the facts of that case.
d. Lehr v. Robertson
The most recent Supreme Court case dealing with the rights of bio-
logical fathers with respect to their illegitimate children is Lehr v. Robert-
son.a3 In that case, the biological father never had contact with his two-
year-old illegitimate child because the child's mother had hidden the
child from him.' The father tried to locate both child and mother for
two years, and finally did so with the help of a detective agency. Shortly
thereafter, the father filed a "visitation and paternity petition."45 How-
ever, he never signed the "putative father registry," which was the statu-
tory means by which the father of an illegitimate child could inform the
state of his intention to claim paternity" and thereby guarantee his re-
ceiving notice of a pending adoption. Because the father had not com-
plied with this registration procedure and did not fall within any of the
statutorily designated classes of putative fathers entitled to notice, he
never received notice of the adoption proceeding brought by the mother
and her new husband.47
42. Id. at 414-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
44. Id. at 269.
45. Id. at 252.
46. Id. at 251. The putative father registry was established to record the name and address
of any person filing a notice of intent to claim paternity, either before or after the birth of a
child out of wedlock. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 372-c(1) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1982-1983).
If a putative father simply mailed a postcard to this registry, he thereby guaranteed that he
would receive notice of any proceeding regarding the adoption of his child. N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 11-a2(c) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1982-1983).
47. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 1-a2(a)-(h). Persons entitled to notice included:
(a) any person adjudicated by a court... [in New York] ... to be the father of
the child;
(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the
United States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the court order
has been filed with the putative father registry... ;
(c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent to claim
paternity of the child... ;
(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's
father;
(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother at the
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The father challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme,
which denied him notice and a hearing before his child's adoption, on
two alternative grounds. First, he contended that a biological father's
actual or potential relationship with his child is a liberty interest pro-
tected under the due process clause. Therefore, the state could not de-
prive him of that interest without first giving him notice and an
opportunity to be heard.4" Second, he claimed that the statute created a
gender-based classification which violated the equal protection clause.49
The Court held that the statute did not violate the father's due process or
equal protection rights because the state had provided a means by which
he could assert his parental rights, and he had failed to avail himself of
that opportunity through the registry procedure. 50
The Supreme Court placed great emphasis upon the fact that the
biological father in this case did not have a developed relationship with
the child. The Court distinguished Stanley and Caban, where the fa-
thers had significant relationships with their children, from Quilloin and
Lehr, where there was little or no relationship between the fathers and
their children. 2 The Court determined that fathers who have partici-
pated in raising their illegitimate children and have developed a relation-
ship with them have constitutionally protected parental rights.5 3 Fathers
who have not developed a parent-child relationship with their children,
but have only a biological relationship, are not entitled to the same pa-
rental rights.54 Accordingly, the Court stated that the father who partic-
ipates in the rearing of his child "acquires substantial protection under
the Due Process Clause ... [b]ut the mere existence of a biological link
does not merit equivalent consitutional protection." 5
Although the Court stated that the biological link does not deserve
time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child's
father;
(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in a
written, sworn statement;
(g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months sub-
sequent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender instrument
(h) any person who has filed with the putative father registry an instruction,
acknowledging paternity of the child ....
Id.
48. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 255.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 264-67.
51. Id. at 262.
52. Id. at 261.
53. Id. at 261-62
54. Id.
55. Id. at 261 (citation omitted).
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"equivalent constitutional protection" to that of a developed parent-child
relationship, the Court's analysis did not suggest that that the biological
link was insignificant. On the contrary, the biological link is extremely
significant in that it is the only means by which a man may acquire the
right to develop a parent-child relationship which is then worthy of con-
stitutional protection.56 Therefore, it may be argued that the right to
establish the biological link is itself worthy of constitutional protection.
Indeed, the Court in Lehr suggests that states must provide a biolog-
ical father of an illegitimate child the means by which he may establish
his paternity so that he may have the opportunity to develop a relation-
ship with his child.57 Otherwise, the father's constitutional rights to
maintain a relationship with his child depend on the cooperation of the
mother or some other custodial parent in allowing the father to develop
such a relationship.58 The fact that statutory procedures to establish pa-
ternity were available to the father in Lehr, and he failed to avail himself
of them, was the basis of the Court's holding that he was not constitu-
tionally deprived of his right to a relationship with his child. 9
2. Conclusions regarding the father's interest
Lehr and the other Supreme Court cases discussed above address a
biological father's interest in maintaining a relationship with his child
where the child's mother was unmarried at the time of the child's birth.
However, these opinions suggest certain conclusions about the nature of
a biological father's interest with respect to his child which are also rele-
vant to a determination of a biological father's interest in establishing his
paternity when his child is born while the child's mother is married to
another man.
First, these cases indicate that a biological father has a constitution-
ally cognizable interest in a relationship with his child which does not
depend on whether he was married to the child's mother when the child
was born.60 The biological link of father to child, not the marital status
of the mother, provides the basis of the father's interest in a relationship
56. Id. at 262.
57. See Buchanan, supra note 18. The Buchanan article contains a thorough discussion of
Lehr and the biological father's "opportunity interest."
58. Id. at 361-62.
59. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264-65. Because the New York statute provided for the putative
father registry and Lehr failed to sign the registry, the court held that he had not taken the
necessary steps to maintain his interest in his child. Id.
60. The Court in Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr never indicated that the fathers'
rights were dependent on the marital status of the mother or father.
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with his child. 1 Therefore, it would be improper to conclude that a bio-
logical father has no cognizable interest in his child simply because the
child's mother was married to another man when the child was born.
Second, a strong argument can be made that Lehr suggests that the
biological link is sufficient to give rise to an "opportunity interest" in the
father to develop a relationship with his child, and that this "opportunity
interest" is worthy of constitutional protection. 2 Therefore, a biological
father has a strong interest in a right to rebut the presumption of legiti-
macy and to establish his paternity so that he may develop a relationship
with his child.
Third, Lehr suggests that the constitutional protection afforded the
father's "opportunity interest" is not dependent on an existing father-
child relationship.63 Although the Supreme Court decisions discussed
above indicate that a biological father's parental rights with respect to his
illegitimate child depend on a relationship between father and child, the
outcome in Lehr suggests that the father's rights in that case would not
have depended on an existing relationship if the state had not afforded a
means by which the father could assert his paternity.64 Therefore, in
determining whether a biological father should be given the right to rebut
the presumption of legitimacy and to establish his paternity, his lack of a
developed relationship with his child alone should not dictate a conclu-
sion that he has no interest worthy of protection under the due process
clause.
Finally, the Supreme Court cases discussed above indicate that the
weight of the father's interest may depend on the facts of the individual
case. 6  Although a father may have a constitutionally cognizable interest
61. Even though the Supreme Court indicated that a father's rights may depend on the
extent to which he has developed a relationship with the child, it is the biological link which
provides the basis for the right to develop that relationship. See Buchanan, supra note 18, at
352.
62. See id. at 351-81. In Lehr, Justice Stevens stated:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.
If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the
child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make
uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
63. See Buchanan, supra note 18, at 360-61.
64. Justice Stevens suggested that the requirements of due process would not have been
met if the state had not provided the father with a means by which he could establish a rela-
tionship with his child. He stated: "If this scheme were likely to omit many responsible fa-
thers, and if qualification for notice were beyond the control of an interested putative father, it
might be thought procedurally inadequate." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263-64.
65. See supra notes 20-59 and accompanying text.
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in establishing his paternity which does not depend on an existing rela-
tionship with his child, his interest may have more weight if he has a
developed emotional or financial relationship with his child or if he has
made persistent efforts to establish such a relationship.6 6 Therefore, it is
necessary for a court to consider the facts of each case to determine the
weight to accord the father's interest.
In summary, a biological father has a strong interest in a right to
establish his paternity because it is the only way in which he may be
legally entitled to an opportunity to develop a relationship with his child.
Since a biological father's interest in maintaining a developed parent-
child relationship is an important interest worthy of due process protec-
tion, a biological father's interest in establishing his paternity certainly
deserves equivalent constitutional protection.
B. The Required Procedure
Assuming that a biological father has a constitutionally cognizable
interest in the opportunity to establish paternity and to develop a rela-
tionship with his child, it is necessary to determine what process must be
accorded that father before he may be denied that interest.67 In deter-
mining what procedural protection due process requires for a constitu-
tionally cognizable interest, the Supreme Court has long employed a
balancing test under which the infringed private interest is weighed
against the asserted governmental interests underlying the procedure
used by the state.6" In Mathews v. Eldridge,6 9 the Court explicitly set out
the factors to be considered in this weighing process. The Court stated:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the pri-
vate interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.70
In applying this balancing test to determine whether denial of stand-
ing to rebut the presumption of legitimacy actually violates a biological
66. See supra notes 25-31, 51-55 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
69. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
70. Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
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father's due process rights, a court must weigh the father's private inter-
est against the state interests asserted to justify denial of standing. In
addition, the court should consider "the risk of the erroneous depriva-
tion"7 1 of the father's interest through the use of such a conclusive pre-
sumption and the value and cost of possible alternatives to the use of this
procedure.
1. The state interests
The state interests asserted to support denial of a biological father's
right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy are the same as those
claimed to be served by the presumption of legitimacy. 72 The primary
governmental objectives asserted to support the presumption of legiti-
macy are: (1) to protect the child from the stigma of illegitimacy; (2) to
provide private support for the child so that the child does not become a
financial burden on the state; and (3) to protect the integrity of the family
unit created by the mother, her husband and the child.73
When the presumption was first incorporated into English common
law from the Roman law, the purposes underlying it were considered so
important that it was treated as a substantive rule of law.74 Therefore, it
was a conclusive presumption which could not be rebutted by any party,
no matter how strong the evidence that the mother's husband was not
the father of the child.75 Gradually, the English law was relaxed to allow
the presumption to be rebutted, but only by evidence of lack of access
between husband and wife which was "strong, distinct, satisfactory and
conclusive." 76
When the presumption was adopted into the laws of the United
States, it was generally treated as a rebuttable presumption. However,
the presumption has remained a very strong one, with court decisions
varying as to the nature and kind of evidence necessary to rebut it.77 In
71. Id.
72. The state interests are the same as those underlying the presumption of legitimacy
because whatever interests are served by a presumption of legitimacy are obviously served by
denying someone the right to rebut the presumption.
73. For a thorough discussion of the public policy underlying the presumption of legiti-
macy, see Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy-Its Legal Effect and
Its Questionable Constitutionality, 35 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 437, 465-67 (1962).
74. Annotation, Presumption of Legitimacy of Child Born to Married Woman as Affected
by Lapse of More than Normal Period of Gestation After Access by Husband, 7 A.L.R. 329
(1920).
75. Id. at 330.
76. Lord Lyndhurst in Morris v. Davies, 7 Eng. Rep. 365, 404 (1837).
77. Some jurisdictions place a very heavy burden on the defendant to rebut paternity. See,
e.g., In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930). Other courts only require the defendant
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addition, most states give only certain specified parties standing to rebut
the presumption and in many states the biological father is not given this
right.78 In those states, the presumption remains conclusive as to the
biological father.
The movement away from a conclusive presumption of legitimacy in
England and the United States was the result of a recognition that the
policies underlying the presumption were not, in many circumstances, as
important as a just and accurate determination of the child's paternity.
Today, changes in societal attitudes and modem scientific advancements
cast even greater doubt upon the continuing validity of the purposes un-
derlying the presumption. The discussion herein will examine the pres-
ent validity of each of the purposes underlying the presumption and will
focus specifically on whether each of these purposes is served by making
the presumption conclusive as to the biological father, while making it
rebuttable as to other parties.
a. stigma of illegitimacy
At the time the presumption was originally formulated, both law
and society stigmatized the child who was born to parents who were not
married.79 Under then prevailing Western morality, the innocent child
was often unfairly condemned or scorned because his parents were not
married at the child's birth. The legal status of the child also depended
on whether or not he was born "in wedlock." An illegitimate child was
considered the child of no man and therefore had no rights of support or
inheritance from his father.80
In recent years however, there has been swift progress in our laws
toward equalizing the treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children.8"
The United States Supreme Court has held that statutes which weigh
arbitrarily against illegitimates are an impermissible means to any gov-
ernment end and will be struck down.8" Accordingly, laws now treat
to rebut the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 Me.
241, 191 A.2d 104 (1963); Commonwealth v. Leary, 345 Mass. 59, 185 N.E.2d 641 (1962).
Finally, several jurisdictions require clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy. See, eg., State v. Mejia, 97 Ariz. 215, 399 P.2d 116 (1965).
78. See Annotation, supra note 3, at 1042.
79. See G. DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW 112 (1979); see also H.
KRAUSE, supra note 2, at 1-5.
80. G. DOUTHWAITE, supra note 79, at 112.
81. Many state statutes have been revised to elevate the status of illegitimate children to
that of legitimate children. Id.
82. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down an Illinois statute
permitting non-marital children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers);
Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that non-marital children have a right to public
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legitimate and illegitimate children equally in most respects.8 3
Along with changes in the law, changing societal attitudes have re-
sulted in less social stigma to those who are illegitimate. With the
number of couples, especially couples in the public eye, who are choosing
to have children out of wedlock, 4 there is less social opprobrium at-
tached to the mother, the father or the child. Therefore, it is clear that
avoiding the stigma of illegitimacy is not nearly as important today as it
was when the presumption of legitimacy was originally formulated.
Even if the purpose of avoiding the stigma of illegitimacy has some
continuing validity today, it is questionable whether this purpose is
served by statutes which allow the mother or the presumed father to re-
but the presumption, while denying the biological father this right. In-
deed, if the biological father is allowed to rebut the presumption, it is for
the purpose of establishing his paternity and "legitimating" the child as
his own." If the mother or the presumed father rebuts the presumption,
the child may be left without a legal father and is, in effect, illegitimate.
Therefore, it is difficult to understand how a presumption of legitimacy
which is conclusive as to the biological father, but is not conclusive as to
the mother or the presumed father, is designed to serve the purpose of
protecting the child from the "stigma of illegitimacy."
assistance); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 184 (1972) (holding that non-maril-
tal children may recover benefits because of their parent's disability under workmen's compen-
sation laws); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (holding that the
mother of a non-marital child may sue for the wrongful death of her child); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that non-marital children have a right to recover damages for the
wrongful death of their mother).
83. Although most laws that discriminate against illegitimates have been struck down, the
Court does not consider illegitimacy a suspect classification, and it has permitted some legisla-
tive classifications to stand. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding a New
York statute requiring a judicial determination of paternity as a precondition to sharing in the
estate of the father who dies intestate); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (upholding
provisions of the Social Security Act which require non-marital children to prove dependency
in situations where marital children need not); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (uphold-
ing a Louisiana statute barring a non-marital child from sharing in the estate of her father who
died intestate).
84. Approximately 3,681,000 live births occurred in the United States in 1982. About
715,200 (or 19.4%) of these children were illegitimate. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1986 at 58, 62 (106th ed.
1985). The overall percentage of illegitimate children has risen dramatically since 1960 when
only 5.3% of children were born illegitimate. By 1970, the percentage had risen to 10.7% and
by 1975, to 14.2%. Id. at 62.
85. A man would only be allowed to rebut the presumption in a proceeding in which he
seeks to establish his own paternity.
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b. financial burden
At the time the presumption of legitimacy originated in our laws,
neither parent was responsible for the support of an illegitimate child
since the child was considered nullius filius or "nobody's child."
'86
Therefore, the state was responsible for the child's support. One purpose
motivating the presumption of legitimacy was to prevent this additional
financial burden from falling on the state by designating a legal father
who would be responsible for support of the child.
8 7
Today, both the mother and father of an illegitimate child are re-
sponsible for the child's support.88 Moreover, present blood testing tech-
niques make it possible not only to exclude the mother's husband as the
father of the child, but also to determine paternity among almost any
group of possible fathers.89 Therefore, it is now possible in most cases to
scientifically determine the legal father whose duty it is to support the
child.
Thus, today the presumption of legitimacy really serves to relieve
the state from support of a child only when the mother is unable to sup-
port the child and the biological father is unknown, unwilling or unable
to support the child. In these situations the state is relieved from its
burden of support as a result of the presumption because the mother's
husband, a man who is not the child's biological father, is compelled to
support the child. It is because of the obvious unfairness in such situa-
tions that many states give the presumed father the right to rebut the
presumption.90
86. S. ScHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS § 1.05, at 1-12, 1-13, 1-14 (4th
rev. ed. 1975).
87. See Comment, supra note 73, at 465-67.
88. Virtually all states now require that the father, as well as the mother, support their
illegitimate children to some degree. See generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMEsTIC RELA-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 5.3-5.4 (1968).
89. The human leukocyte antigen test (HLA test) has the capability of excluding between
78% and 80% of all non-fathers. When this test is used in conjunction with several of the
more conventional blood tests, the exclusion ratio is even more impressive. A joint report of
the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American Bar Association (ABA) recom-
mends the use of a series of seven serologic tests that offer a cumulative probability for exclud-
ing over 91% of all non-fathers. Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic
Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 257 (1976). Due to the in-
creased reliability of such tests, some courts are allowing the admission of HLA tests to prove
paternity. Under the traditional rule, admission of blood test results was limited to those
situations in which such tests established that a putative father was not the true parent of a
child. See Note, Cutchember v. Payne: Approaching Perfection in Paternity Testing, 34 CATI.
U.L. REV. 227 (1984) (discussing recent court decisions which have accepted the HLA test as
a reliable proof of paternity).
90. See generally Annotation, supra note 3 (listing some states which give a presumed
father the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy).
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Statutes that allow the presumed father to rebut the presumption
but do not give the biological father that same right, do not serve the
purpose of avoiding a financial burden on the state. When the presumed
father rebuts the presumption of legitimacy, the child has no legal father
responsible for his support and this burden may fall upon the state. Con-
versely, if the biological father is allowed to rebut the presumption and
establish his own paternity, the child will have a new legal father who is
required to support the child. Thus, laws which allow the presumed fa-
ther to rebut the presumption, but do not allow the biological father to
do so, are structured so as to defeat, rather than support this purpose of
the presumption.
c. family integrity
Courts have often stated that one of the primary purposes support-
ing the presumption of legitimacy is to protect the integrity of the family
unit created by the mother, her husband and the child. 91 A conclusive
presumption of legitimacy protects family integrity in two ways. First,
the presumption protects family integrity by keeping knowledge of the
child's true paternity from the mother's husband and the child. The pre-
sumption presumably serves this purpose because it helps to prevent
marital disruption as a result of the husband's knowledge that he is not
the biological father of the child.92 Additionally, the presumption may
prevent the child from suffering the confusion and torn loyalties which
may result from learning that someone other than his mother's husband
is his biological father.93
A second way in which family integrity may be protected by a con-
clusive presumption of legitimacy is that the presumption prevents a bio-
logical father from intruding into the family unit by enforcing visitation
rights with his child. It is possible that in some situations such visitation
rights could cause conflict between members of the family unit created by
the mother, her husband and the child.
Clearly, for these reasons, a presumption of legitimacy which is con-
clusive as to all biological fathers serves the purpose of protecting family
integrity in many cases. However, it is important to note that such a
presumption also prevents a biological father from establishing his pater-
nity in situations where the establishment of paternity would not protect
91. See Comment, supra note 73, at 465-67.
92. See, eg., A v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1225-26 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021
(1982); see also infra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Petitioner F. v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1075, 1079 (Del. 1981), discussed
infra at notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
A FATHER'S RIGHT
family integrity or where the potential disruption of the family is so slight
that it should not be deemed to outweigh a biological father's interest in
the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child. Thus, in many
cases, a presumption conclusive as to all biological fathers may not serve
the significant state interest of protecting family integrity.
For example, a conclusive presumption may not keep knowledge of
the child's paternity from the presumed father or the child. A presumed
father may already know that someone else is the child's biological fa-
ther. The child may also know that the presumed father is not his or her
biological father, or the child may be too young to understand the con-
cept of paternity. In such cases, denial of a father's right to rebut the
presumption does not preserve family integrity by keeping knowledge of
paternity from the presumed father and the child. Under such circum-
stances, such withholding of knowledge may not be sufficiently impor-
tant to outweigh the biological father's interest in the opportunity to
develop a relationship with his child.
Furthermore, the fact that a conclusive presumption may keep the
biological father from "intruding" into an ongoing family relationship
may not be a significant state interest in many cases. For example, there
may be no existing family unit formed by the mother and the presumed
father. If the presumed father is dead or no longer married to the child's
mother, denying a biological father the right to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy does not necessarily serve to protect family harmony.
Moreover, in an action in which a biological father's paternity is
established, a court could determine the rights of the biological father in
a manner most conducive to protecting the child's welfare and family
harmony under the circumstances of that particular case.9 4 For example,
the biological father may be given only limited visitation rights to the
child if this is deemed to be in the child's best interests.9"
Thus, whether denying standing to a biological father to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy serves the purpose of protecting the family
94. The circumstances in such a case are similar to the situation in which a mother and
father divorce after the child is born, and the mother who has custody of the child subse-
quently marries another man. In such cases, courts have structured the rights of the parties in
a manner most conducive to the best interests of the child. For example, in a typical case, the
mother may be given sole rights of custody and control of the child. The biological father may
be given visitation rights with respect to the child, as well as a duty to support the child. The
mother's husband normally has no duties or rights with respect to the child. However, since
the child resides with him, the child is likely to develop a psychological parent-child relation-
ship with him.
95. It is possible that a court may also determine that the mother's husband has certain
legal rights regarding the child in spite of the fact that biological paternity has been established
in another. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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unit really depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
Although denial of standing to the father may serve this purpose under
some circumstances, it may not have any effect on family harmony in
other situations, particularly where there is no existing family unit. Since
in many cases there is no reason to deny rebuttal of the presumption in
order to protect family integrity, legislatures in many states have given
the mother and the presumed father the right to rebut the presumption.96
Courts have upheld statutes that give the mother and the presumed
father this right, but deny the biological father the same right, on the
rationale that the mother and the presumed father are within the family
unit while the biological father is not.9 7 These courts have reasoned that
since the mother and the presumed father are within the family unit, they
would only seek to rebut the presumption when the family unit cannot be
threatened by such action. However, since the biological father is outside
the family unit, he may decide to bring an action to rebut the presump-
tion in circumstances in which the action would disrupt family integ-
rity.98 Therefore, these courts have held that the biological father should
96. When the mother or presumed father seeks to rebut the presumption, it is clear that
the circumstances are such that rebuttal would not disrupt family harmony. In this regard,
one California court stated:
The matter of "the integrity" of the family has been referred to from time to
time as something which should not be impugned and that therefore the conclusive
presumption should prevail regardless of truth or fact.
Does anyone believe that there is any integrity in the family where the wife has
admittedly associated with other men and has given birth to a child which could not
possibly in fact be the child of her husband and the husband has so charged such
facts in a verified proceeding and has proven his allegations therein set forth beyond a
peradventure of a doubt? Where is the moral soundness, the freedom from corrup-
tion, the state of innocence to be preserved in such a situation?
Wareham v. Wareham, 195 Cal. App. 2d 64, 84, 15 Cal. Rptr. 465, 478 (1961) (Fourt, J.,
concurring).
97. See, eg., X, Y and Z, 641 P.2d at 1225-26, discussed infra at notes 106-16 and accom-
panying text.
98. In addition, the Wyoming Supreme Court in X, Y, and Z, suggested that to give a
claiming biological father the right to rebut the presumption would allow anyone outside of
the family unit (i.e. even a person who is not the biological father), for any motive, to bring an
action which may disrupt family harmony. Id. at 1227. Although in theory this reasoning
may be accurate, it is unlikely that a man would seek to rebut the presumption and assert
paternity for some motive other than his desire to establish a relationship with his child, since
the claimant would be responsible for supporting the child if he is successful in establishing his
paternity.
Moreover, if someone other than the biological father brings such an action simply to
harass or to disturb those within the family unit, that person would be subject to suit for
malicious prosecution. Furthermore, since there are other less complicated and less expensive
means by which one with improper motives may notify the husband and/or the child of his
alleged paternity, it seems unlikely that such a person would bring a court proceeding to rebut
the presumption and to establish his paternity in such a situation.
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not be given the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.
This difference in the position of those within and those outside the
family unit may be sufficient to allow a statute distinguishing between the
rights of the biological father and the rights of the mother and the pre-
sumed father to withstand challenge under the equal protection clause.99
However, in analyzing whether such statutes violate the due process
clause, the relevant question is not whether there is a legitimate reason
for distinguishing between the rights of these parties. Rather, the rele-
vant question is whether there is a legitimate state interest in denying all
biological fathers the right to rebut the presumption and how much
weight should be given that interest when balanced against the interest of
biological fathers in establishing their paternity."°°
Clearly the state has a legitimate interest in protecting family integ-
rity and the welfare of the child. However, the weight that should be
given this interest when balanced against a biological father's interest de-
pends on the facts of the individual case. Where there is no family unit
to protect, or where family harmony would not be significantly disrupted
by establishing paternity in the biological father, the state interest should
not be given as much weight as in situations where the family unit or
family harmony would suffer significantly. Legislatures and courts have
acknowledged that the weight of the state interest in protecting family
harmony depends on the circumstances of the particular case by allowing
the presumed father and the mother to rebut the presumption in situa-
tions where these parties determine that family harmony cannot or will
not be protected.
2. Weighing the interests
Under the criteria set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,101 there are
three distinct factors that must be weighed to determine what procedural
protections due process requires in order to preserve a biological father's
interest in an opportunity to establish paternity and to develop a relation-
ship with his child.10 2 These factors are: (1) the biological father's inter-
est; (2) the state interests underlying denial of a biological father's right
to rebut the presumption, and (3) the risk of "erroneous deprivation" of
the father's interest through the use of such a conclusive presumption,
99. See infra notes 182-270 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether such stat-
utes violate the equal protection clause.
100. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
101. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
102. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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and the value of alternative procedural safeguards." 3
In evaluating the biological father's interest versus those of the state,
state courts employ two significantly different methods of analysis. First,
a court may weigh these interests in a general way and decide that in all
cases the state interests will outweigh the biological father's interest or
that in all cases the biological father's interest will outweigh the state
interests. Under this analysis, if a court finds that a biological father's
interest always outweighs the state interests, then the statute denying
him the right to rebut the presumption would be deemed unconstitu-
tional on its face. However, if a court finds that the state interests always
outweigh any biological father's interest, the statute would be deemed
constitutional and no biological father would be allowed to rebut the pre-
sumption of legitimacy under any circumstances. This method of analy-
sis is represented by a recent decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court
and is referred to herein as the "Wyoming Approach."'"
The second method of evaluating the competing interests is to con-
sider the facts of the particular case in weighing the biological father's
interest against the state interests and to evaluate these interests on a case
by case basis. Thus, this method allows a court to consider the facts of
the individual case in deciding whether to give a particular biological
father the right to rebut the presumption. Under this method, a court
would not hold that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, but would
hold that it is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of a particular case
when the court determines that a biological father should be given the
right to rebut the presumption. This is the method which has been em-
ployed by the California Supreme Court and will be referred to herein as
the "California Approach."' 1
Cases setting forth both approaches are discussed below. Although
the California Approach is preferable to the Wyoming Approach, the
California Approach is not the most preferred method of analysis since it
requires that in every case a court must decide the constitutionality of a
statute denying the biological father the right to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy.
a. the Wyoming Approach
The issue of whether a biological father's due process rights are vio-
103. Id.
104. See infra notes 106-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases following the
Wyoming Approach.
105. See infra notes 127-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases following the
California Approach.
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lated by a denial of his right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy arose
in A v. X, Y, and Z, 106 a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of
Wyoming. The Wyoming statute in question was based on the Uniform
Parentage Act. 10 7 The statute conferred no standing to a biological fa-
ther to establish paternity in a child born in wedlock to a mother and her
husband.
In this case, the child was conceived approximately three months
before the mother married the presumed father but was born after she
had married him.10 The putative biological father alleged that he was
the biological father of the child; that he had financial means to provide
for the child's needs and that he desired to do so. 09 He requested that he
be declared the child's legal father and that he be given visitation rights
and an obligation to support the child.' Although the court assumed
that all of the putative father's allegations were true, it nevertheless
found that he was not denied due process by a construction of the statute
which conferred no standing on him to establish his paternity.1
In analyzing the father's claim that the lower court's construction of
the statute denied him due process, the Wyoming Supreme Court first
stated that the father had no private interest which was entitled to pro-
tection by legal process, since he had no statutory or common law right
to maintain an action for paternity. 2 The court thus suggested that the
only interest a father could have in this situation is an interest created by
law and that a biological father has no constitutionally cognizable inter-
est which arises from his biological connection to the child.
Although the court rejected the contention that the biological father
had any interest in his child which deserved protection under the Consti-
tution, it stated that even assuming arguendo that such an interest ex-
isted, the father would still not be denied due process by a statute
denying him the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.1 The
court stated that any assumed private interest on the part of the father
must be weighed against the government interests of protecting the fain-
106. 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982).
107. Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120 (1977). These provisions are identical to those provi-
sions of the UPA set forth, infra in the Appendix.
108. It should be noted that the child was less than two years old at the time this case was
decided. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d at 1222.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1226-27. In addition, the court held that the claimant was not denied equal
protection of the law. Id. at 1224. See also infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text, 222-26
and accompanying text.
112. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d at 1226-27.
113. Id. at 1227.
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ily unit and the legitimacy and well-being of the child.114 Weighing these
interests, the court held that the government function far outweighed any
private interest of the father.115 Therefore, the due process clause did not
require a hearing to protect any interest the father may have.'
16
Similarly, in Petitioner F. v. Respondent R., I" the Supreme Court of
Delaware held that a state statute denying a biological father standing to
seek custody or visitation with respect to his child conceived and born
during the marriage of the mother to another man did not deprive the
biological father of any due process rights. In this case, the biological
father had filed a petition in the family court to seek custody or visitation
rights with respect to his child born two days before he filed the peti-
tion. 118 Under the state custody statute, only a "parent" had standing to
initiate a child custody proceeding and only a "parent" denied custody
was entitled to visitation privileges."19
Thus, the court recognized that the father's action was, in effect, one
for determination of his parentage of the child. The court held that the
word "parent," as used in the statute, meant the child's legal parent, and
in the case of a married woman who bears a child, her husband is the
legal father and parent because of the presumption of legitimacy.
120
Therefore, the biological father had no standing as a "parent" to seek
114. Id.
115. In reaching this conclusion, the court quoted the trial court's opinion letter which
stated:
"I don't believe that a statute which prevents a biological father from bastardizing a
child violates due process of law. It appears that the legislature has carefully
weighed the various social values and decided that the biological father's rights are
subordinate to the collective rights of the child, the mother, the presumed father and
the family unit."
Id.
116. In fact, the Wyoming court suggested that if the state had afforded a hearing to the
father, that may have been construed as state action violative of the due process clause in that
it infringed on the "private realm of family life" protected by this clause. The court stated:
The bringing of such action and the resulting hearing would attack the family unit
and the child's legitimacy and well being, and it would cause the harm sought to be
avoided, regardless of the outcome of the hearing. Any stranger desiring to injure
the mother, the child, or the presumed father, for whatever reason, could inject dis-
ruptive elements into the family unit by instituting such action,
Id.
117. 430 A.2d 1075 (Del. 1981).
118. The claimant sought custody "so that he might better provide for the needs of the
child." Id. at 1077. The mother and her husband jointly acknowledged parentage of the child
in an affidavit and opposed the petition for custody and visitation by the claiming biological
father. They alleged that they were cohabitating at the time of the child's conception and
birth, and that they lived together with the child and other children as a family unit. Id.
119. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 721, 727 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
120. Petitioner F., 430 A.2d 1075 at 1077-78.
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custody or visitation. 21
Relying on Stanley v. Illinois,22 the biological father asserted that
he was constitutionally entitled to a hearing on the issue of his paternity
because the right of a natural father is a substantial liberty interest pro-
tected by the due process clause. The Delaware court stated that it
agreed fully with the principle set forth in Stanley that unwed fathers are
generally entitled to the protection of the Constitution.1 23 However, the
court stated that it did not follow from Stanley "that a man claiming
paternity has a constitutionally protected interest in a determination of
his parental status.., with respect to a child conceived and born during
the marriage ... of the child's mother to [another man]." '124
The court thus distinguished Stanley from Petitioner F. because
Stanley did not involve the determination of paternity. Moreover, the
court distinguished the interest of the father in Stanley, whose interest
was in the children he had " 'sired and raised,'" from the interest of the
father in Petitioner F. who "in the eyes of the law and in actuality, is a
stranger to the child."1 2 '
The court went on to state that even assuming arguendo, that the
father in this case had a constitutionally cognizable interest, that interest
must be weighed against competing state interests to determine if the
father's interest warranted due process protection. The court held that in
this case any constitutionally cognizable interest of the father would be
outweighed by "the very powerful countervailing public interest in pro-
moting the marital relationship, preserving intact an existing family unit,
and protecting the minor child from confusion, torn affection, and the
life-long stigma of illegitimacy."
126
In summary, under the Wyoming Approach represented by the de-
cisions of the Wyoming Supreme Court and the Delaware Supreme
Court, the courts did not appear to consider the facts of the individual
121. Id. at 1078. Although in this case, the Delaware Supreme Court denied the biological
father standing to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, the court was construing the word
"parent" in the child custody act in effect at that time. Since the date of this ease, Delaware
has adopted a version of the UPA which explicitly allows a biological father the right to bring
an action to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 805 (Supp.
1984) (effective July 19, 1983).
122. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Stanley.
123. Petitioner F., 430 A.2d at 1078. The court also cited Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979) and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, rehg denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978). See supra
notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
124. Petitioner F., 430 A.2d at 1078-79.
125. Id. at 1079.
126. Id.
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case in weighing the biological father's interest against the competing
state interests. Rather, these decisions suggest that in every case, no mat-
ter what the facts, such a biological father has no constitutionally pro-
tectible interest in his child; therefore, the state interests underlying the
presumption of legitimacy will always prevail. Accordingly, a state stat-
ute which denies a biological father the right to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy and to establish his paternity would never violate a father's
due process rights. Thus, these courts indicate that it is not a denial of
due process for a statute to provide a conclusive presumption of legiti-
macy as to all biological fathers.
b. the California Approach
In 1975, the California Supreme Court decided In re Lisa R. 27
There, the main issue was whether the biological father could offer proof
to establish his paternity despite the California statute which provided
that the child was presumed the legitimate issue of the mother's marriage
to another man. Under the statute, only the mother, her husband, their
descendants or the state could dispute the presumption of legitimacy. 128
Therefore, the presumption was conclusive as to the biological father be-
cause he lacked standing to contest it.129 The biological father argued
that the denial of standing was a violation of his due process rights.
Relying heavily on Stanley, the court weighed the competing private
and state interests.130 It reasoned that the biological father had a consti-
tutionally cognizable interest in his child which arose from the fact that
he had lived with the child's mother both before and after the child's
birth, had contributed to her support, and had visited the child when he
was able to do so. 1 3 1 The state interests identified by the Lisa R. court
127. 13 Cal. 3d. 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975).
128. CAL. EVID. CODE § 661 (West 1966) (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004
(West 1983)).
129. Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d at 647, 532 P.2d at 130, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
130. Id. at 647-51, 532 P.2d at 130-33, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 482-85. The court stated:
In broad terms Stanley states that the interest of an unwed father in his children
is not only cognizable but also of sufficient substance to warrant deference except
when the deprivation comports with equal protection and due process require-
ments. . . . The question whether appellant, as one claiming to be Lisa's natural
father, can rebut the presumption that Lisa is the issue of her mother's marriage
must thus be resolved by weighing the competing private and state interests.
Id. at 648, 532 P.2d at 131, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
131. Id. at 649, 532 P.2d at 131-32, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84. The child's mother was
separated from her husband and was living with the biological father at the time of the child's
birth. The mother, biological father and child continued to reside as a family for four or five
months. The mother then returned to her husband and took the child with her, contrary to
the wishes of the biological father. Id.
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were protection of the child's welfare, protection of the child from the
stigma of illegitimacy, and protection of the family unit.132 Weighing the
father's interests and the state interests, the court held "for reasons at
least as compelling as those in Stanley, that a presumption which pre-
cludes to appellant in the instant circumstances a right to offer evidence
to prove that he is the father of the minor child is unreasonable, arbitrary
and capricious and a denial of due process."' 33
The Lisa R. court recognized that the asserted state interests were
legitimate legislative purposes, but held that these purposes were insuffi-
cient to justify an irrebutable presumption as to the father under the facts
of this case.' 34 First, the court noted that a conclusive presumption as to
the biological father did not necessarily serve to secure the child's welfare
but, to the contrary, could actually defeat that purpose if the natural
father were able to provide proper parental care and control.1
35
Second, the state's interest in protecting the child from the stigma of
illegitimacy was deemed insufficient to overcome the father's rights be-
cause a biological father seeking to establish his paternity would un-
doubtedly intend to legitimatize the child. 136 Third, the Lisa R. court
noted that the presumption did not serve the purpose of protecting the
family unit in this case because there was no longer any such unit ex-
isting. Both the child's mother and the presumed father were dead at the
time the biological father sought to establish paternity.
37
The Lisa R. court also recognized that another possible legitimate
state interest supporting a conclusive presumption of legitimacy would be
the increased speed and efficiency of judicial inquiry. 138 The court thus
suggested that the state might assert that a conclusive presumption saves
132. Id. at 649-50, 532 P.2d at 132, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
133. Id. at 651, 532 P.2d at 133, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
134. Id. at 650-51, 532 P.2d at 132-33, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85.
135. Id. at 650, 532 P.2d at 132, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484. The child in this case had been
made a dependent ward of the juvenile court because of certain drug and alcohol related
problems of her mother and her mother's husband, the presumed "legal" father. The child
had resided in several foster homes. At the time of the fourth annual review by the juvenile
court of the child's dependency status, the biological father sought to establish his paternity to
afford him visitation rights and eventually to terminate the child's dependency status. The
juvenile court held that he had no standing to offer evidence of his paternity. In the juvenile
court proceeding, the father had offered proof that he planned to establish a relationship with
the child and thereafter to establish a home for her. Id. at 640-41, 532 P.2d at 125-26, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 477-78.
136. The court noted that in this case it appeared that the biological father had already
legitimatized the child in accordance with the relevant state statute. Id. at 649 n.14, 532 P.2d
at 131 n.14, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 483 n.14.
137. Id. at 650, 532 P.2d at 132, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
138. Id. at 650-51, 532 P.2d at 132-33, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85.
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courts the time and effort of having to determine in each case whether
the father should be given standing. However, the court indicated that
the state's interest in administrative efficiency would not be sufficient to
outweigh the biological father's interest in every case. 39
Analogizing to Stanley, the Lisa R. court rejected the notion that a
presumption of legitimacy which is conclusive as to the biological father
should be upheld for the reason that it is more convenient to presume in
each case that the mother's husband is the father than to allow a biologi-
cal father to prove that he is the father.1" The court thus indicated that
in every such case a court must determine whether due process requires
that the claiming biological father be allowed to present proof of his
paternity. 141
The California Supreme Court recently decided Michelle W v. Ron-
ald W.," 2 which also addressed due process issues resulting from a state
statute that denied a biological father the right to rebut the presumption
of legitimacy. The facts of this case are particularly interesting with re-
gard to the weighing of the competing private and state interests under
the due process clause.
In Michelle W., the biological father had a sexual relationship with
the child's mother while she was married to another man. The child was
born during the marriage. The mother, her husband (the presumed fa-
ther) and the child lived together for four years after the child's birth and
the presumed father fulfilled all the obligations of parenting the child.
Following dissolution of the marriage, custody of the child was given to
the child's mother." 3 Approximately one year after the marriage was
dissolved, the mother married the child's biological father and the child
thus became a member of this new family unit.
139. Id.
140. The court noted that in Stanley, the Supreme Court concluded that due process pre-
cluded the conclusiveness of the presumption of unfitness, even though it may be argued that
unwed fathers are seldom fit parents. Id.
141. The court stated in a footnote:
As our discussions have indicated, the reasonableness of a statutory limitation
on the right to offer proof of parentage depends on circumstances prevailing in each
particular case. Accordingly, a court, before receiving evidence thereof, must in each
instance make a preliminary determination, as by offer of proof, that due process
concepts would be offended if the particular claimant to parentage were denied an
opportunity to prove his claim.
Id. at 651 n.17, 532 P.2d at 133 n.17, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 485 n.17.
142. 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct.
774 (1986).
143. At the time the mother and the presumed father were divorced, the issue of paternity
was not raised. After the dissolution, the presumed father provided child support for the child
and exercised his visitation rights on a regular basis. Id. at 358-59, 703 P.2d at 90, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 750.
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The biological father then brought an action to establish his pater-
nity of the child."4 The California trial court construed the California
statute to deny the claiming biological father the right to rebut the pre-
sumption of the child's legitimacy. 45 On appeal, the claiming biological
father asserted that the statute prevented him from establishing a legal
parent-child relationship and thereby deprived him of a liberty interest
protected by the due process clause.
146
The California Supreme Court stated that the issue of whether the
statute violated the claiming biological father's due process rights " 'must
be resolved by weighing the competing private and state interests.' "147
In order to determine the weight of the private interest involved, the
Michelle W. court first reviewed the United States Supreme Court cases
of Stanley, Quilloin v. Walcott,'48 and Lehr v. Robertson,'49 and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court case of Lisa R. The court concluded that the bio-
logical father's abstract interest in establishing paternity was "not as
weighty as the interests of the fathers in Stanley and Lisa R."'I ° In
reaching this conclusion, the court stated that there was a clear and sig-
nificant difference between the termination of a developed parent-child
relationship and a denial of a right to legally establish paternity.
The court then suggested that the important distinction is that the
putative biological fathers in Stanley and Lisa R. "'were seeking to es-
tablish their legal relationship with children who otherwise had no par-
ents and were wards of the state.' ""I' The court pointed out that the
state in this case had not made any effort to prevent the biological father
from establishing a relationship with the child. The state was only
144. The action was also brought by the child, Michelle, age six, through her guardian ad
litem. Id. at 359, 703 P.2d at 90, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
145. California Evidence Code § 621(a) provides in full: "(a) Except as provided in subdivi-
sion (b), the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp.
1986). Subdivision (b) allows rebuttal of the presumption of subdivision (a) by blood test
evidence. Id. § 621(b). Subdivision (d) provides: "The notice of motion for blood tests under
subdivision (b) may be raised by the mother of the child not later than two years from the date
of birth if the child's biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging pater-
nity of the child." Id. § 621(d). No statutory provision explicitly allows the biological father
the right to raise a notice of motion for blood tests.
146. Michelle W., 39 Cal. 3d at 359-60, 703 P.2d at 90-91, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
147. Id. at 360, 703 P.2d at 91, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 751 (quoting In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636,
648, 532 P.2d 123, 131, 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, 483 (1975)).
148. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
149. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
150. Michelle W., 39 Cal. 3d at 362, 703 P.2d at 92, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53.
151. Id. (quoting Estate of Cornelius, 35 Cal. 3d 461,466, 674 P.2d 245, 248, 198 Cal. Rptr.
543, 547, appeal dismissed, 466 U.S. 967 (1984)).
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preventing him from establishing a "legal" relationship where the child
had a continuing emotional and financial relationship with the presumed
father. 152
The opinion thus suggests several conclusions reached by the
Michelle W. court about the nature and extent of a biological father's
interest in establishing his paternity. Most importantly, the court's lan-
guage may be interpreted to suggest that the biological father has an in-
terest in establishing paternity which, in an appropriate case, is deserving
of due process protection. The court suggested that the relevant inquiry
is not whether the father has a constitutionally cognizable interest in his
child, but rather, how much weight should be accorded the father's inter-
est under the facts of the particular case.
In determining the weight to be given to the father's interest, the
Michelle W. court suggested several considerations. First, the court indi-
cated that the biological father's interest is not as great when the child
has a parent and more particularly when the child, as in this case, has a
"legal" father with whom she or he has an existing emotional and finan-
cial relationship. 153 On this point, the court's reasoning is questionable,
since facts concerning the child's relationship with the presumed father
are more relevant to an analysis of the state interest in protecting family
integrity.
Second, the court suggested that since the biological father in this
case had a developed relationship with the child, his interest in establish-
ing paternity was accorded less weight. The court indicated that since he
already had a relationship with the child, the state was not depriving him
of an interest in such a relationship by denying him a right to establish
paternity. 5 4 This conclusion does not comport with prior United States
Supreme Court cases which indicate that the weight to be accorded a
biological father's interest in his child is dependent upon the father's ef-
forts to develop a relationship with his child.' Moreover, the court did
not adequately address the point that the biological father's interests
were affected by depriving him the right to establish a legal relationship
with his child." 6
In examining the weight of the governmental interests involved in
152. Michelle W., 39 Cal. 3d at 362, 703 P.2d at 92, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 752. The court stated
that it left open the issue of the validity of section 621 as applied to situations where the state
has attempted to prevent the relationship between a child and its biological father. Id. at 362
n.4, 703 P.2d at 92 n.4, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 752 n.4.
153. Id. at 362, 703 P.2d at 92, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 20-66 and accompanying text.
156. If the biological father is unable to legally establish his paternity, he has no legal rights
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this case, the Michelle W. court stated that the important governmental
interests were the upholding of the integrity of the family and the protec-
tion of the child's welfare.157 The court indicated that the state's interest
in protecting the family was served by preserving the developed parent-
child relationship with the "legal" (i.e., presumed) father even though
the child was not living with the presumed father. 58 It suggested that
this furthered the child's welfare because such relationships furnish
young children with social and emotional strength and stability. The
court thus implied that when a child has a presumed father with whom
the child has a developed parent-child relationship, and that presumed
father opposes the establishment of paternity in another, the state has a
strong interest in the protection of that relationship, even if the presumed
father is not part of the family unit in which the child resides.' 59
In reality, the court's opinion appears to be more concerned with
protecting the rights of the presumed father than with protecting the
family unit or the welfare of the child. Although the Michelle W. court
indicated that preserving the legal relationship between the child and
presumed father protected family integrity and the child's welfare, under
the facts of this case, it is difficult to see how these interests were served
by denying the biological father the right to establish paternity. It can be
inferred from the facts that the child was living with the biological father
and thus had a relationship with him which was probably of a parent-
child nature. It also seems apparent that the child was aware that this
man claimed to be her biological father and that her mother did not dis-
pute that assertion. 160 Therefore, the establishment of paternity in the
biological father could not have brought her previously unknown infor-
with regard to his child which he may enforce. Therefore, his relationship with his child is
totally dependent on the mother allowing him to have a relationship with the child.
157. Michelle W., 39 Cal. 3d at 362, 703 P.2d at 92, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 753. The court
expressly rejected the presumed father's argument that the stigma of illegitimacy should be
considered as a state purpose supporting the constitutionality of § 621. The court stated that
because the state had adopted the Uniform Parentage Act which states that "the parent and
child relationship extends equally to every child and every parent, regardless of the marital
status of their parents," a consideration of the stigma of illegitimacy is without any legal effect.
Id. at 362 n.5, 703 P.2d at 92 n.5, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 752 n.5.
158. Id. at 363, 703 P.2d at 93, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 753. The court made this observation
regarding the state's interest with reference to the child's claim. However, the state interests
underlying the statute are the same, regardless of whose private interests are being evaluated.
Moreover, the court states that the interest of the child in this case is treated as an appendage
to the rights of the biological father.
159. Id.
160. The court noted that the guardian ad litem bringing suit on behalf of the child was a
family friend of the mother and the biological father. Id.
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mation about her parentage which could have caused her confusion and
torn loyalties.
Furthermore, in this case there was no reason why the establishment
of paternity in the biological father would have necessarily resulted in
any disruption in the child's life which would be detrimental to her wel-
fare. If the biological father were determined to be the child's legal fa-
ther, a court could have structured the rights of the parties involved in a
manner most conducive to the child's welfare. For example, the biologi-
cal father could have been given shared custody with the mother. This
would not have changed the home environment for the child since the
child was already living with the mother and the claiming biological
father.
Moreover, under California law, it is possible that the presumed fa-
ther's visitation rights could have been maintained even if he were no
longer the child's "legal" father.' 61 The child could thus have enjoyed
the same emotional relationship with him that she enjoyed when he was
her "legal" father. Therefore, in this case the only real change in the
position of the child which necessarily would have resulted from the bio-
logical father becoming the child's legal father would have been that the
burden of support would have shifted to the biological father.
Therefore, it appears that in spite of the language of the opinion, the
real concern of the court in Michelle W. was a weighing of the respective
interests of the presumed father and the biological father. It seems the
court really made a determination as to which person it deemed most
deserving of a "legal" father-child relationship with the child. The court
concluded that the presumed father was most deserving of legal paternity
since he was originally presumed the legal father, had supported the
child, and had maintained a relationship with the child. This interest
was deemed more important than the biological connection asserted by
the biological father, even though he also had an emotional relationship
with the child.
The California Supreme Court's analysis in this case deserves special
attention because it clearly demonstrates the subjective manner in which
a court may apply the balancing test to determine whether a biological
father's due process rights have been violated. It also indicates that a
court must employ this balancing process in every case in which a biologi-
161. See id. at 367-69, 703 P.2d at 95-97, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 755-58 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Bird, in a dissenting opinion, argued that under California law the presumed
father in this case would have been entitled to visitation rights even if the biological father had
been established as the "legal" father of the child. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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cal father seeks the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.1 62 In-
deed, the Michelle W. court stated that it did not interpret the
presumption of legitimacy contained in the statute to be a "conclusive
and unchangeable presumption," '163 because the competing interests
must be weighed in each case to determine whether due process requires
that the biological father be given the right to rebut the presumption.164
Therefore, under the California Approach set forth in Michelle W.
and in Lisa R., the facts of the individual case must be considered in
weighing a biological father's interests against the asserted state inter-
ests.165 These interests cannot be weighed by the court in any abstract
sense but only on a case by case basis. For example, in the case of Lisa
R., the fact that the biological father had made diligent efforts to estab-
lish his paternity and develop a relationship with his child was consid-
ered a significant factor in determining the weight to be accorded the
father's interest. 66 Moreover, the fact that there was no family unit to
162. See id. at 360, 703 P.2d at 91, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 751. The court stated: "We have held
that the issue of whether section 621 adequately protects a putative father's interests 'must be
resolved by weighing the competing private and state interests.'" Id. (quoting In re Lisa R.,
13 Cal. 3d 636, 648, 532 P.2d 123, 131, 119 Cal Rptr. 475, 483, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1014,
reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 885 (1975)) (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 364, 703 P.2d at 94, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
164. The court stated:
In our due process analysis, we have declined to interpret section 621 as an absolute
bar to all suits to establish paternity by either the putative father or the presumed
legitimate child. Rather, we have applied the balancing test analysis of Lisa R. and
Estate of Cornelius. In contrast to Caban, although Donald R. and Michelle [the
putative father and the child] are not able to rebut the presumption under the facts of
this case, this does not mean that all putative fathers and all presumed legitimate
children are barred in all cases.
Id. at 365, 703 P.2d at 94, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
165. A recent case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also considered
the facts of the case in deciding that due process did not require that the biological father be
given the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy under the circumstances involved in that
case. P.B.C. v. D.H., 396 Mass. 68, 73, 483 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct.
1286 (1986).
In addition, a special concurring opinion in a recent case decided by the Colorado
Supreme Court also considered the facts of the case in determining the weight to be accorded
the state interests and the biological father's interest. See R. McG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 354,
615 P.2d 666, 671 (1980) (Dubofsky, J., specially concurring). In weighing these interests, this
concurring judge stated that the state's interest would prevail if the father had not continually
tried to maintain contact with the child and had not indicated his desire to support his child.
Id. at 355, 615 P.2d at 673. However, since the father in R. McG. had made such efforts to
form a relationship with his child, and since he had no alternative remedy to protect his inter-
est in the child, the concurring judge found that he had standing to assert his interests in a
court proceeding. The concurring judge stated that "[o]therwise, his constitutional right to
due process of law in order to protect his basic right to conceive and raise his child has been
denied." Id. at 356, 615 P.2d at 674 (Dubofsky, J., specially concurring).
166. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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protect was extremely important in the court's determination that the
state's interests were not of sufficient importance to outweigh the biologi-
cal father's interests. 67
Similarly, in Michelle W., the California Supreme Court emphasized
the necessity of considering the facts of each case in weighing the private
and state interests in order to determine the constitutionality of the stat-
ute as applied to that particular case. 68 Although the court did not hold
that the statute was unconstitutional on its face, it did, in effect, hold that
a statute cannot constitutionally provide a presumption of legitimacy
which is conclusive as to all biological fathers in all circumstances.
Thus, under the California Approach, a court must examine the
facts of each case in weighing the private and state interests, and deter-
mine whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied in that case.
Therefore, the constitutionality of the statute may be subject to review in
each case in which a biological father seeks to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy.
c. summary
In weighing the private and state interests, the California Approach
is preferable to the Wyoming Approach. Since the strength of these in-
terests varies significantly according to the facts of a particular case,
those facts should influence a court's weighing of the biological father's
interest and the state interests. Therefore, it is not possible to weigh
these interests in an abstract sense, as did the Wyoming Supreme Court,
and to determine that in every case the state interest outweighs the bio-
logical father's interest.
For example, the language of the United States Supreme Court
opinion in Lehr v. Robertson169 suggests that a biological father has a
protectible interest to establish paternity even if his only connection with
the child is the biological link.'70 However, it is clear that the interest of
a father who has developed a relationship with his child should be ac-
corded greater weight in the determination of whether his due process
rights have been violated. 7'
Similarly, there is no way to meaningfully evaluate the state's inter-
est in any general way. The weight of the state's interests is affected by
the facts of each case. For example, protecting a child from the stigma of
167. See supra text accompanying note 137.
168. See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
169. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
170. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 27-31 and text accompanying notes 51-55.
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illegitimacy is not as significant an interest if the facts indicate that the
father intends to legitimate the child. Providing private support for the
child is not a weighty state interest if the facts demonstrate that the bio-
logical father is willing and able to support the child. Indeed, this state
interest may carry no weight if the facts show that the presumed father
will not or cannot support the child, while the biological father can and
will do so.
Furthermore, protection of the family unit, which is the strongest
state interest underlying the presumption today, may have very little
weight in certain circumstances. For example, where it is clear that the
presumed father and child already have knowledge that the child is not
the child of the presumed father, this purpose is less compelling. More-
over, in many cases there is no family unit to protect. The mother and
the presumed father may be divorced or the presumed father may be
deceased at the time the action is brought, and the child may have no
existing father-child relationship with the presumed father. In these
cases, the asserted state interest of protecting the family unit would have
little force.
Certainly, a biological father's interest should be deemed to out-
weigh the state interests when the biological father has a developed rela-
tionship with the child, is willing and able to legitimate and support the
child, and there is no family unit to protect. 172 In other situations as
well, the biological father's interest may outweigh the state interests be-
cause of the facts of the particular case. Therefore, whenever a biological
father seeks the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, a court
should consider the facts of the individual case to determine whether
denial of this right to the biological father violates his right to due pro-
cess of law.
3. Alternative procedures
To determine the requirements of procedural due process, Mathews
v. Eldridget 73 suggests that a court must consider not only the private
and state interests involved in such cases, but also the availability of al-
ternative procedures.174 Thus, a court should consider the value and cost
of alternative procedures which may protect the biological father's inter-
172. However, if a court followed the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in
Michelle W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 215 Cal. Rptr. 748, it may also be necessary for the
child and the presumed father not to have any continuing relationship in order for the biologi-
cal father's interest to outweigh the state interests. See supra notes 151, 153, 158-59 and ac-
companying text.
173. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
174. Id. at 348-49. See also supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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est and the state interests, while imposing relatively little burden upon
the state. Although the cases discussed above failed to address this issue,
an evaluation of available alternative procedures is essential to determine
the procedural due process protections required for a biological father's
interest.
The procedural alternative to a conclusive presumption of legiti-
macy is an individualized hearing to determine whether the biological
father, under the circumstances of that particular case, should be given
the right t6 rebut the presumption. In evaluating this alternative proce-
dure under the Mathews analysis, it is necessary first to examine the value
of a hearing in reducing the risk of an "erroneous deprivation" of a bio-
logical father's interest through the use of a conclusive presumption. 175
Second, it is necessary to examine the fiscal and administrative burden
which would be imposed upon the state by the requirement of a hearing
in each case.
176
a. the value and costs of a hearing
The use of a conclusive presumption of legitimacy carries a high risk
of "erroneous deprivation" of the father's interest. This could be re-
duced, if not avoided, by the use of an individualized hearing. A pre-
sumption which is construed to deny every biological father the right to
rebut the presumption of legitimacy does not take into consideration the
facts of each individual case. Therefore, such a presumption allows a
biological father's interest in developing a legal relationship with his
child to be permanently foreclosed without regard to an actual finding
that the state interests may be served in that case by a denial of this right
to the biological father.
Indeed, under the facts of a particular case, the interests of the state
in protecting the welfare of the child may best be served by granting the
biological father the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy and to
establish his paternity. 177 In such cases, the use of a conclusive presump-
tion erroneously deprives the father of his right to a relationship with his
child. Therefore, a hearing in each case to determine whether the father
should be allowed to establish his paternity would clearly avoid the risk
of an erroneous determination, resulting in a serious and irreversible dep-
rivation of a father's important paternal rights.
Although the value of individualized hearings is significant, it is still
175. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348-49.
176. See id. at 347.
177. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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necessary to evaluate the costs of such hearings to determine if they are
required under the due process clause. It is clear that individualized
hearings would impose a greater fiscal and administrative burden on the
state than does the use of a conclusive presumption. However, the
Supreme Court has often indicated that constitutionally cognizable inter-
ests are entitled to due process even though some administrative effi-
ciency may be sacrificed.1 78 Therefore, the value of individualized
hearings to protect the important interests of biological fathers should
outweigh the costs associated with the provision of such hearings.
Moreover, in California and in other states which may apply the
California Approach on this issue, hearings are currently required to de-
termine whether the statute violates due process as applied to the facts of
each case. 179 In those states there would be no additional burden placed
on the state in requiring an individualized hearing in each case to deter-
mine whether a biological father should be given the right to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy.
b. the nature of the hearing
The only significant difference in the procedure employed by the
California Supreme Court and the procedure employed by a court fol-
lowing the Mathews analysis would be the purpose of the hearing which
is held in each case. The purpose of the hearing required by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court is to determine the constitutionality of the statute as
applied to the facts of the case. The purpose of the hearing required by a
court following the Mathews analysis would not be a determination of the
constitutionality of the statute, since the statute would be deemed uncon-
stitutional on its face.
Under the Mathews analysis, a statute construed to deny all biologi-
cal fathers the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy should be
unconstitutional on its face because: (1) a biological father has an impor-
tant interest in an opportunity to develop a relationship with his child;
(2) the government's primary interest in protecting the welfare of the
child is not served in all cases by denying the biological father the right
to rebut the presumption; and (3) there is an available alternative proce-
178. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (procedural safeguard must be af-
forded "if that may be done without prohibitive cost"); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22
(1972) ("[p]rocedural due process is not intended to promote efficiency"); Stanley, 405 U.S. at
656 (due process clause "designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy govern-
ment officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones").
179. See supra notes 140-41 and 152-68 and accompanying text.
April 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:705
dure of providing an individualized hearing in each case which would
greatly increase the protection afforded the biological father's interest
while imposing relatively little additional burden upon the state. Thus, a
court applying the Mathews analysis should hold that due process re-
quires a hearing in each case to determine whether the biological father
should be given the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy.
Therefore, the focus of the hearing required under the Mathews
analysis should be on factors relating to whether it is in the best interests
of the child to allow the biological father the right to rebut the presump-
tion of legitimacy and to establish his paternity. This is the appropriate
focus of such a hearing because the biological father's interest in a rela-
tionship with his child will be protected unless it is shown that the estab-
lishment of paternity in the biological father would not promote the
child's welfare. Since protecting the child's welfare is the primary policy
underlying the state's interest in a conclusive presumption of legitimacy,
such a hearing also protects the state's interest.
The factors which should be considered in a hearing to determine
whether it is in the child's best interests to allow the biological father to
establish his paternity would include: (1) the nature of the existing rela-
tionship between the biological father and the child; (2) the existence and
nature of a family unit created by the mother, the child and the child's
presumed father; and (3) the biological father's ability and desire to as-
sume the obligations of fatherhood. 180 The court should also consider
any other relevant factors in determining whether denying the father
standing to establish paternity would be in the child's best interests.
180. These factors are similar to those suggested by the Supreme Court in Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978). See supra note 33 and accompany-
ing text.
One of the primary factors to be considered in each hearing is the existence and nature of
the family unit in order to preserve a harmonious family environment for the child. However,
it should be noted that at least one court has suggested that there should be no hearing to
determine whether a biological father has a right to rebut the presumption, because such a
hearing would disrupt family harmony. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
Although a hearing itself may have the potential to cause some disruption in the family
unit, this should not be sufficient to deny all biological fathers the right to such a hearing.
First, the hearing could be a closed proceeding in which only necessary parties are given notice
and an opportunity to appear. Second, it is highly unlikely that the hearing itself would be the
source from which the presumed father and the child learn of the biological father's alleged
paternity. If a biological father wants to assert his paternity, he may do so by simply notifying
the presumed father or the child that he is the child's biological father.
Moreover, it is not knowledge of paternity, but rather the creation of legal rights in the
biological father, which really has a significant potential for disruption of the family unit. The
hearing itself determines whether, under the facts of that case, the creation of legal rights in
the father may disrupt the family unit.
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These factors are primarily the same factors which are considered
under the California Approach in balancing the biological father's inter-
est against the state interests."' However, it is preferable for a court to
hold that, based on Mathews, due process requires a hearing in every case
to determine whether a father should be given the right to establish his
paternity, rather than to hold that in each case the constitutionality of
the statute must be reviewed to determine whether a conclusive presump-
tion violates the father's due process rights as applied to the facts of that
case.
Although the decision of whether the biological father should be
given the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy may be the same
under either approach, the Mathews approach is preferable because it
does not compel a review of the constitutionality of the statute in every
case. It also allows the court to focus its attention more squarely on
protecting the welfare of the child as well as protecting the rights of the
biological father.
C. Conclusions Regarding Due Process
A statute that is construed to deny all biological fathers the right to
rebut the presumption of legitimacy should be deemed unconstitutional
on its face as a denial of due process of law. A biological father's interest
in an opportunity to establish his paternity and to develop a relationship
with his child is worthy of protection under the due process clause.
Therefore, a biological father should not be denied the right to establish
paternity unless the state interests clearly outweigh the biological father's
interest.
Since the weight of these interests depends on the facts of the indi-
vidual case, it is necessary for a court to consider the facts of each case in
evaluating these interests. Thus, due process requires a hearing in each
case to determine whether a biological father should have the right to
rebut the presumption of legitimacy and to establish his paternity. A
biological father should be denied this right only if it is shown that it is in
the best interests of the child to prevent him from establishing his
paternity.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION
The constitutionality of statutes that deny a biological father the
right to rebut a presumption of legitimacy and establish his paternity
may also be challenged on the grounds that such statutes violate the
181. See supra notes 127-59 and accompanying text.
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equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 8 2 A statute that
denies a biological father the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy
and to establish his paternity, while giving the mother this right, creates
a classification which arbitrarily treats a biological father differently than
the child's biological mother.
To determine whether this classification violates the equal protec-
tion clause, a two-part analysis is required. It is necessary first to deter-
mine what standard of review a court should apply with respect to such a
statutory classification,18 3 and, second, to analyze whether this statutory
classification can be upheld under the appropriate standard.
A. The Applicable Standard of Review
A classification that denies biological fathers the right to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy, while giving the mother this right, must
touch upon a fundamental right to trigger strict scrutiny analysis.
184
Generally, in order for a right to be deemed fundamental, the right must
be "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."18 No
182. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides that "No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The same constraints placed upon the
states by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment are placed upon the federal
government by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
183. Historically, there were two standards of review which were applied by courts in deter-
mining whether a statute violates the equal protection clause. The first or conventional stan-
dard requires only that the differing treatment of classes under the statute must be "rationally
related" to a conceivable "legitimate state interest." See, eg., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,
97 (1979). Under the second standard, the statutory classification is subject to "strict scru-
tiny" and the state has the burden of establishing that it has a "compelling interest" which
justifies the law and statutory purpose. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
Generally, this second test has been applied to statutory classifications which are drawn along
lines which render it "suspect," such as classifications based on race or national origin. See,
e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (prohibition on miscegenation); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (restrictions on movement of Japanese-Americans). The test has also
been applied to classifications which touch upon a "fundamental interest" or "rights explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the constitution." See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) (sterilization of criminals).
• Some statutory classifications, which have not been considered "suspect" or to touch
upon a "fundamental right," nevertheless have been judged by a third standard of review more
demanding than the traditional "rational basis" test. Classifications based on alienage, illegiti-
macy, or gender have been deemed to be subject to an intermediate-level scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) (alienage); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766-67
(1977) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender).
184. Since the classification in question does not involve a "suspect class" such as race or
origin, it must touch upon a "fundamental interest" in order for it to be deemed subject to
strict scrutiny. See supra note 183.
185. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
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United States Supreme Court case has suggested that a father's right to a
relationship with his child born while he is not married to the child's
mother is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Indeed,
in cases dealing with the rights of fathers of illegitimate children, the
Supreme Court has indicated that this is not a fundamental right and
accordingly has never applied the strict scrutiny standard to a review of
classifications denying the father this right."8 6
However, a statutory classification that denies biological fathers the
right to establish their paternity, while giving biological mothers that
same right, may nevertheless be subject to a stricter standard of review
than the "rational basis" test.' 7 Such a classification may be deemed a
gender-based classification and therefore the state may be required to
meet an intermediate level of review which is higher than the rational
basis test but lower than the strict scrutiny test.'88
In order for a court to consider such a classification to be gender-
based, the court must view the classification as one distinguishing be-
tween men and women on the basis of sex. A statute that distinguishes
186. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978). See also supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text for a
discussion of those cases.
187. Under the "rational basis" test such a classification most likely will be upheld since the
Supreme Court has routinely upheld statutes under this standard of review. See, e.g., United
States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (upholding federal statute effectively
providing, in some situations, more retirement benefits to those who had worked first for a
non-railroad employer and then a railroad employer than to those who had worked first for a
railroad employer and then a non-railroad employer); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979) (upholding rule excluding methadone-program participants from employ-
ment as bus drivers). But see United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)
("mere rationality" review used to strike down federal statute denying food stamps to house-
holds containing unrelated persons).
188. Gender classifications were originally subjected only to the rational basis test. See L.
TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1060. Therefore, such classifications were usually upheld. See, e.g.,
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948) (upholding statute prohibiting a woman not
the wife or daughter of a tavern owner from becoming a bartender), disapproved, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.23 (1976). In the early 1970's, the Supreme Court began to subject
gender-based classifications to a stricter level of review, although the Court still purported to
be employing the rational basis test. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) (invalidating
state statute preferring males over females in the administration of estates); see also L. TRIBE,
supra note 12, at 1063. In one case, a plurality of four justices even argued that such classifica-
tions should be deemed "suspect" and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (invalidating federal statute automatically providing
benefits to married servicemen, but requiring servicewomen to demonstrate the dependence of
their husbands). Although the Court never resolved that gender classifications should be held
subject to strict scrutiny, in 1976 it began to review such classifications under an "intermedi-
ate" level of review which was expressly higher than the rational basis test. See Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to men ages 18-
21, but not to women).
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between the rights of biological parents of a child on the basis of whether
a parent is male or female may be deemed a gender-based classification.
For example, in Caban v. Mohammed,18 9 the United States Supreme
Court held that the inflexible statutory distinction between the fights of
unwed mothers and unwed fathers with respect to their authority to veto
the adoption of their children was an invalid gender-based distinction. 19
Accordingly, statutes that give a mother the fight to rebut the pre-
sumption of legitimacy and to establish paternity in the biological father,
while denying the biological father that same fight, may be deemed to
distinguish between biological parents on the basis of gender. Indeed, in
one recent case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that such a statutory
scheme was based on a gender classification which discfiminated between
natural mothers and claiming natural fathers and, therefore, the court
utilized the intermediate level equal protection analysis in reviewing the
statute's constitutionality.' 91 The Colorado Supreme Court stated:
This statutory scheme creates more than a difference in
treatment of natural mothers and fathers. It establishes con-
trary treatment.... Section 19-6-107(1) exemplifies a gender-
based classification predicated on an overbroad generalization
that a mother has a legitimate interest in establishing a determi-
nation of paternity in a non-spousal father, while such father
has no interest in establishing a determination of paternity in
himself. 1
92
However, in A v. X, Y, and Z,'93 the Wyoming Supreme Court sug-
gested that the identical statutory scheme was not gender-based because
the statute not only allowed the mother the right to establish paternity in
someone other than the presumed father, it also gave the child and the
presumed father this right.' 9 4 The court suggested that since approxi-
mately 50% of children and 100% of presumed fathers who may assert
189. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
190. Id. at 394. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
191. R. McG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980).
192. Id. at 351-52, 615 P.2d at 671. See infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
193. 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982).
194. Id. at 1226. The Wyoming Supreme Court also stated that the statutory scheme
should not be deemed to be gender-based because a biological father could assert his interest
under other statutory provisions not applicable to the case. For example, the biological father
could assert his interest pursuant to the statute in circumstances "in which the child has no
presumed father, or in which the presumption of paternity resulted from a man taking the
child into his home and holding it out as his own." Id. The court thus suggested that one
should look to the statute as a whole, rather than to individual provisions, in order to deter-
mine whether a particular provision is gender-based. Id.
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this right would be male, it is difficult to conclude that the classification
is gender-based.195
The X, Y, and Z court stated that "[tihe classification is based on a
distinction between those within the family unit and those without re-
gardless of gender."' 196 Thus, according to the Wyoming court's analysis,
the classification is not gender-based and its constitutionality under an
equal protection analysis would only be subject to the "rational relation-
ship" test. 197 Nevertheless, the Wyoming court stated that the classifica-
tion would pass constitutional challenge under a gender-based standard
of review and indeed under any standard by which it may be
measured.198
Although the Wyoming court may be correct in its assertion that
the classification in the statute is based on distinctions between those
within the family unit and those outside the family unit, the classification
nevertheless distinguishes between the rights of biological parents with
respect to their child on the basis of the sex of the parent. It gives the
female biological parent rights that it does not give the male biological
parent, and therefore, the classification should be reviewed as a gender-
based classification.' 99
Furthermore, even if the classification is viewed as distinguishing
between those within the family unit and those outside the family unit, it
should still be deemed a gender-based classification despite the fact that
the family unit includes both males and females. The classification does
not distinguish between two groups-one group consisting of biological
fathers (and all those outside the family unit) and another group consist-
ing of biological mothers, their husbands and the children. The mother's
right to bring an action does not depend on the concurrence of her hus-
band or the child.2" Therefore, even though persons of the male sex are
195. Id. A recent opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also determined
that such a statutory scheme was not gender-based because it allowed presumed fathers as well
as mothers to initiate proceedings raising the issue of the child's paternity. P.B.C. v. D.H., 396
Mass. 68, 74-75, 483 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1286 (1986).
196. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d at 1226.
197. See supra notes 183, 187, 188 discussing rational basis test.
198. Id. The court stated that the classification would withstand even the strict scrutiny
test.
199. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
200. Professor Harry D. Krause, who was instrumental in the drafting of the UPA, asks
whether it makes sense to view X, Y and Z as a sex discrimination case. He then raises this
question:
Would the problem disappear (and gender equality be preserved), if the UPA
provided that a married mother may not bring an action against another man without
her husband's consent? The low likelihood that a married mother might wish to
bring such an action against the will and without the consent of her husband caused
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also given a statutory right to bring the action, the biological mother as
an individual is given rights that are not given to the child's biological
father. Thus, such statutes discriminate between biological parents based
on their sex.
Since these statutes are gender-based, their constitutionality should
be reviewed under the intermediate level of review accorded gender-
based classifications, i.e., the classification "must serve important govern-
mental objectives" and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives.2" 1 Although the United States Supreme Court has
indicated in some cases that if the sexes are not "similarly situated," a
gender-based statute will only be subject to minimum rationality re-
view," its decisions in this regard are not uniform. Other cases dealing
with gender-based classifications have applied an intermediate level of
review and have suggested that the fact that the sexes may not be "simi-
larly situated" is not sufficient to uphold the statute's constitutionality." 3
This Article contends that the intermediate level of review is the
preferred standard of review for the gender-based classification in ques-
tion here, since it assures adequate protection of the biological father's
interest. The fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in these cir-
cumstances should not be deemed sufficient to justify the application of a
minimum rationality review. However, under the intermediate level of
review, the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated is an important
consideration in determining whether the statute is "substantially re-
lated" to its proclaimed governmental purpose.2"
B. Application of the Standard
In order for a statute to overcome a constitutional challenge under
the drafters of the UPA to disregard this possibility. If dissenting Justice Rose and
the majority of the Colorado Supreme Court in R. McG. v. J. W., cited in the dissent,
have a point, this drafting error should be remedied.
H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW, CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 814 (2d ed. 1983).
In Michelle W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 703 P.2d 88, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1985), the
California Supreme Court rejected the contention that the statute involved an impermissible
gender-based distinction, because the mother of the child could bring suit to rebut the pre-
sumption of legitimacy only if the biological father had filed an affidavit with the court ac-
knowledging paternity of the child. The court thus stated that the rights of the mother and the
biological father were conditioned upon each other. Id. at 365, 703 P.2d at 94, 216 Cal. Rptr.
at 754-55.
201. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
202. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1979) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
J.).
203. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281 (1979).
204. See infra notes 219-42 and accompanying text which discuss the "similarly situated
approach."
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the intermediate level of review accorded gender-based classifications,
such a classification "must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. '20 5 In
applying this standard to the statutory classification in question, the first
issue a court must resolve is whether the objectives underlying the classi-
fication are important.
The legislative objectives which theoretically underlie statutes con-
strued to deny a biological father the right to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy and establish his paternity, while giving the biological mother
this right, are the same as those traditionally stated to underlie the pre-
sumption of legitimacy. Those objectives are: (1) protection of the child
from the stigma of illegitimacy; (2) provision of private support for the
child; and (3) protection of the family unit.20 6
A court would certainly hold that these asserted state interests are
important.0 7 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a
state has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the integrity of
the family unit.20 Moreover, the asserted state interest of protecting the
well-being of illegitimate children, and in particular of promoting their
legitimatization, has been recognized by the Court. 0 9 Furthermore, the
Court typically has had little difficulty in finding that the legislative
objectives that are proclaimed to underlie statutory gender-based distinc-
tions are "important. ' '2 '0  Therefore, there seems little question that a
205. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Some commentators suggest that this stan-
dard has no predictable application and therefore cannot support consistent decisionmaking.
See Hull, Sex Discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of Kahn v. Shevin
and Orr v. Orr, 30 SYRACUSE L. RIV. 639, 671 (1979); see also Note, Refining the Methods of
Middle-Tier Scrutiny: A New Proposal for Equal Protection, 61 TEx. L. RPv. 1501, 1554
(1983).
206. See supra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., R. McG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980). There, the Colorado
Supreme Court stated that there was no question that "the interest of the state in preserving
the integrity of family units already in existence and fostering child rearing in harmonious
family settings" are important interests and within the state's power to implement. Id. at 351,
615 P.2d at 670. However, as discussed previously, the actual importance of these interests
may vary, depending on the facts of the case. For example, the interests of protecting the child
from the stigma of illegitimacy and providing the child with support from a presumed father
may not be significant in a situation where the biological father seeks to establish his paternity.
If the biological father establishes his paternity, he will "legitimate" the child and will be
compelled to support the child. Therefore, the primary legislative objective which may sup-
port the classification is the protection of the family unit from the possible disruption which
may result from the assertion of paternity in someone other than the mother's husband. See
supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
208. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
209. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246, 255, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
210. In most cases, the Court has found that the asserted legislative objective is important.
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court would find that the legislative objectives that are asserted to sup-
port the denial of a biological father's right to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy are important.
The second and more difficult question in analyzing whether the
gender-based classification involved in these statutes can overcome a
challenge under the equal protection clause, is whether the classification
is "substantially related" to these objectives. United States Supreme
Court decisions reveal two possible approaches regarding the "substan-
tial relation" requirement.21
Under one approach, the state must show a substantial difference
between men and women that is relevant to the classification.2"2 Accord-
ingly, this approach requires the state to show that the reason for bur-
dening members of one sex does not apply with equal force to members
of the other sex because the sexes are not "similarly situated." 2 3 This
approach, referred to herein as the "similarly situated approach,"2" 4 has
been most prominent in the Court's decisions.215
A second approach to the "substantial relation" requirement has
been explicitly recognized by the Court in recent cases.21 6 Under this
approach, the state must not only show that the classification is based on
relevant differences between men and women, but also that there is a
sufficiently good reason for the differing treatment of the sexes.2" 7 Under
this approach, hereinafter the "gender-neutral approach, '21 8 it is more
See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280 (1979) (provision for needy spouses and compensation
for past discrimination); Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-200 (enhancement of traffic safety). But see,
e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727-30 (1982) (state failed to estab-
lish "important" purpose in limiting enrollment in nursing school to women); Orr, 440 U.S. at
279-80 (preference for family unit in which wife is dependent not a permissible purpose).
211. For a thorough discussion of the two methods by which the Supreme Court has treated
the "substantial relation" requirement, see Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the
Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983); Comment, The "Substantial Relation" Question in
Gender Discrimination Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 149 (1985).
212. For a complete review of cases applying this approach to gender-based classifications,
see Comment, supra note 211.
213. Id. at 154-56.
214. In referring to this approach, this Article has adopted the terminology employed in
Comment, supra note 211. Another commentator has referred to this approach as the "Rehn-
quist-Stewart approach" because these Justices usually employ this method of analysis in cases
regarding gender discrimination. Freedman, supra note 211, at 931-38.
215. See Comment, supra note 211, at 154.
216. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464 (1981); Orr, 440 U.S. 268.
217. See Comment, supra note 211, at 153-54.
218. Id. at 154. This Article has adopted the terminology employed in Comment, supra
note 211, in referring to the "gender-neutral" approach. Another commentator designated
this the "Brennan-Marshall approach" since Justices Brennan and Marshall (usually joined by
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difficult for the state to demonstrate that the classification is "substan-
tially related" to important government objectives. Since the Court has
yet to decide unambiguously which approach is appropriate, it is neces-
sary to examine the statutory classification in question under both ap-
proaches to determine whether it may be deemed "substantially related"
to the asserted state interests.
1. The similarly situated approach
Under the "similarly situated" approach, the relevant question is
whether the classification is based upon a substantial difference between
biological mothers and biological fathers. This classification denies bio-
logical fathers the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy and to
establish paternity, while giving biological mothers this same right.
Therefore, under this approach, it would be necessary for the state first to
show that there is a substantial difference between biological mothers and
biological fathers. The state, however, must also establish that this dif-
ference is relevant to the purposes upon which the classification is pur-
portedly based, namely: (1) protection of the child from the stigma of
illegitimacy; (2) provision of support for the child; and (3) protection of
the family unit.219
It would be difficult for a state to meet this burden and show that
there is any substantial difference between biological fathers and biologi-
cal mothers that would be relevant with respect to protecting the child
from the stigma of illegitimacy or to providing support for the child. If a
mother is allowed to rebut the presumption and is successful in such an
action, the child may be denied the status of legitimacy and the support
of the child's presumed father. If, however, the biological father is suc-
cessful in such an action, he will legitimate the child and incur an obliga-
tion to support the child.120 Thus, the classification that allows mothers,
but not biological fathers, to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, can
actually work against the state's asserted interests of protecting the child
from the stigma of illegitimacy and of providing support for the child.
It may be possible for a state, however, to show that a substantial
difference exists between biological mothers and biological fathers with
respect to the proclaimed purpose of protecting the family unit. In this
regard, the state may argue that biological mothers are part of the family
Justice White and recently by Justice O'Connor) have employed this approach in analyzing sex
discrimination cases. See Freedman, supra note 211, at 949-60.
219. See supra notes 72-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes upon
which such legislation is based.
220. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
April 1987]
754 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:705
unit in which the child resides and biological fathers are not. Biological
mothers would therefore be less likely to bring an action to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy and establish paternity in someone other than
the presumed father when that action may threaten the family unit. Ar-
guably, a biological mother would not bring such an action unless the
family unit has already been disrupted or unless the mother perceives
that the family unit is strong enough to withstand any potentially disrup-
tive effects of that action.
This argument was accepted by the Wyoming Supreme Court in A v.
X, Y, and Z. 22 The analysis of the court there indicates how the "simi-
larly situated" approach may be used in determining whether a statutory
classification that denies biological fathers the right to rebut the pre-
sumption of legitimacy and to establish their paternity violates the equal
protection clause.222 In concluding that the statute did not violate the
equal protection clause,223 the court stated that "[i]f the classification can
be said to be gender-based, it is not invidious but only realistically reflects
the fact that sexes are not similarly situated in these circumstances." '224
In reaching this conclusion, the Wyoming court stated that the stat-
utory classification was based on "obvious" biological differences be-
tween men and women and that these differences are "the very
foundation of the classification., 225 These differences, according to the
court, are that women give birth to children where men do not and,
therefore, the fact of motherhood is obvious while the fact of fatherhood
must be proven.226 Thus, the Wyoming court indicated that the statu-
tory classification was based on certain biological differences between
men and women.
Some United States Supreme Court cases have indicated that certain
biological differences are legitimate distinctions upon which some classi-
fications may be based without violating the equal protection clause.227
221. 641 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982). This argument was
also accepted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in P.B.C. v. D.H., 396 Mass. 68,
74-75, 483 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1286 (1986).
222. The Wyoming Supreme Court did not identify its approach as the similarly situated
analysis or distinguish its approach from the gender-neutral analysis. However, the language
of the opinion indicates that the court did in fact apply the rationale of the similarly situated
approach. X, Y and Z, 641 P.2d at 1225.
223. Id. at 1224-26.
224. Id. at 1226. However, the court stated that the classification was not, in any case,
gender-based and thus indicated it should only be subject to minimum rationality review. See
supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
225. X, Y and Z, 641 P.2d at 1225.
226. Id.
227. See, eg., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion); Gedu-
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For example, in Michael M, v. Superior Court,2 28 the Court upheld Cali-
fornia's statutory rape law, which penalized men, but not women, for
having sexual intercourse with persons under eighteen years old. Justice
Rehnquist's plurality opinion justified the statute's differing treatment of
the sexes on the ground that young women were not "similarly situated"
to young men "with respect to the problems and the risk of sexual inter-
course," '229 because of the fact that only women can become pregnant.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion indicated that this biological difference
between the sexes was sufficiently related to the asserted state purpose of
this classification, which was to prevent teenage pregnancies. 230 Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the threat of becoming pregnant was a "natu-
ral" deterrent to sexual intercourse for minor women, but not for males,
since they could not become pregnant. 231 Therefore, it was reasonable
for the state to "equalize" the deterrent for both sexes by penalizing
males for sexual intercourse with young women.232 Thus, Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion attempted to show how biological differences between the
sexes were sufficiently related to the asserted state purpose of preventing
teenage pregnancies.233
Whenever the state seeks to support a classification on biological
differences, it should be necessary for the state to show that such biologi-
cal differences are related to the purpose of the classification. However,
in X, Y, and Z, the Wyoming Supreme Court made no effort to illustrate
how the asserted biological differences between the sexes were relevant to
a statutory classification which denied a biological father the right to es-
tablish his paternity while simultaneously giving the biological mother
that right. While the biological differences between a man and a woman
may be relevant to other classifications within the Uniform Paternity Act
(UPA), such as a distinction between the procedure required of a mother
to establish her maternity versus the procedure required of a father to
establish his paternity, these biological differences do not support the
statutory classification at issue in this case.234
lig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (approving state and employer temporary disability plans
that excluded benefits for pregnancy).
228. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (plurality opinion).
229. Id. at 471.
230. Id. at 469-73.
231. Id. at 473.
232. Id.
233. However, Justices Brennan and Stevens, in separate dissents, asserted that Justice
Rehnquist's reasoning did not adequately establish the relationship between the classification
and the statute's asserted goal. Id. at 488 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 496 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
234. The Wyoming court suggested that one must look at all the classifications in the UPA
April 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:705
Another basis upon which the Wyoming Supreme Court determined
that biological mothers and biological fathers are not similarly situated is
that the mother in these circumstances is a part of the family unit in
which the child resides, while the biological father is outside the family
unit.235 The court agreed with the lower court opinion which stated that
the legislative objective in creating the statutory classification was to pro-
tect the family unit from a suit by one outside the marriage because such
a suit could well destroy the marriage.236 The court approved the analy-
sis of the lower court which stated that no problem existed in allowing
mothers, or others within the family unit, to bring a parentage action
because those persons "are in the best position to judge whether the mar-
riage can stand the trauma or has already failed.
2 37
Thus, the Wyoming court actually upheld the gender-based classifi-
cation on the basis of a difference between a biological mother and a
biological father which is created by law. When a mother is married at
the time of her child's birth, the mother is within the family unit where
the child resides because the law provides that the biological mother has
a right to custody and presumes that her husband at the time of the
child's birth is the child's father.2 31 Yet, if someone other than the
mother's husband is the child's biological father, the law prevents the
biological father from being a part of the family unit in which the child
resides. Thus, the difference in the positions of a biological mother and a
biological father with respect to the family unit is a legally-created
distinction.
Arguably, a court should not justify a gender-based classification on
the basis of a legally-created difference between the sexes, because a legis-
lature may then create "real" sex differences and use those differences to
support a subsequent gender-based statute.239 However, the state may
contend that the legally-created distinction, that biological mothers are
part of the family unit while biological fathers are not, is based on certain
to determine whether the statutory scheme as a whole invidiously discriminates against biolog-
ical fathers. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d at 1226; see also supra note 194.
235. A v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d at 1225-26. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
236. Id. at 1225.
237. Id.
238. If a child is born to a married woman, our laws today provide that the mother and her
husband (the child's presumed father) have an equal right to custody of the child. See H.
CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 17.1, 17.4 (1968).
Thus, our laws determine that the mother and her husband will be within the family unit in
which the child resides.
239. See Freedman, supra note 211, at 939, for a discussion and critique of the approach by
which the state may try to justify certain gender classifications on the basis of certain other
gender distinctions previously created by the state itself.
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natural or biological differences between the sexes. Since the woman
gives birth to the child and the man does not, maternity is easier to prove
than paternity. The state may argue that for this reason mothers are
given custody of their children at birth and are thus part of the family
unit in which their children reside.
If the legally-created distinction is deemed to be based on biological
differences, then it is arguable that a statute denying a biological father
the right to establish his paternity, while giving the mother that right,
may be justified on the basis of this legally-created distinction. Some
United States Supreme Court decisions 4 have suggested that when le-
gally-created differences are based on certain natural or biological differ-
ences between the sexes, those legally-created differences may validly
support a classification based upon them.241 Thus, it is possible that a
court applying the similarly situated approach could uphold the classifi-
cation in question because the legally-created difference in the positions
of the biological mother and the biological father may be based on natu-
ral or biological differences between the sexes.
Although a court could apply this reasoning to justify the classifica-
tion in question, a court should not do so for two reasons. First, whether
a court should justify a classification on the basis of a legally-created
distinction is debatable, even if that legally-created distinction may be
based on certain biological differences.242 That the state can make a bio-
logical father an "outsider" to his child simply because he did not physi-
cally give birth to the child, and then justify denying him the right to a
relationship with his child because he is an outsider, hardly seems fair.
Second, and even more unfairly, statutes that deny the biological
father the right to establish paternity, while giving the mother the right
to establish the biological father's paternity, could be drawn in a manner
which would give both biological parents the right, and still serve the
asserted state interests. Since the statutes could be drawn in such a gen-
der-neutral manner, a court should not justify the classification on the
basis that the biological parents are not similarly situated. A court re-
viewing the classification in question should not apply the "similarly situ-
ated" approach, but should instead follow the gender-neutral approach,
described below.
240. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347
(1979); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
241. See Freedman, supra note 211, at 939-40.
242. See supra note 239.
April 1987]
758 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:705
2. The gender-neutral approach
Under the gender-neutral approach, a state must show not only that
there is a difference between men and women which is relevant to the
legislative objective of the classification, but also that there is a sufficient
reason for not treating the sexes identically.243 Accordingly, this ap-
proach requires that the state demonstrate that a statute which discrimi-
nates against one sex furthers or protects a state interest that would not
have been protected by a gender-neutral classification. Thus, a court ap-
plying the gender-neutral approach must consider the feasibility of effec-
tive gender-neutral alternatives to achieve the asserted state interests.24
When these alternatives are available, the court must hold that a broad
sex-based classification is not substantially related to the asserted state
interests.
Several gender-neutral alternatives to gender-based statutes have
been suggested in recent Supreme Court cases. One such gender-neutral
alternative is a statute which burdens both sexes, rather than just one sex,
and yet still accomplishes the asserted legislative objective.2 45 Thus, one
gender-neutral alternative to the statutes in question here would be stat-
utes which deny both biological mothers, as well as biological fathers, the
right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy and to establish paternity in
a non-spousal father. Since denying both mothers as well as fathers this
right would serve the asserted state objective of protecting the family
unit, the state must show that there is a good reason for not also prevent-
ing mothers from challenging the presumption.
Therefore, under a gender-neutral test, the state would have to illus-
243. See Comment, supra note 211, at 152-56. As that commentator points out, the gender-
neutral test is not simply an alternative to the similarly situated approach, but is a requirement
imposed in addition to the similarly situated test. Id. at 156.
244. See, eg., Orr, 440 U.S. at 281-83. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, reasoned
that a statute making only husbands liable for alimony was not substantially related to achiev-
ing the state goal of providing financial assistance to needy spouses. A gender-neutral alterna-
tive was available in the form of individual hearings where a decision could be made about
financial need. See also Freedman, supra note 211, at 949-51, discussing the importance of
gender-neutral alternatives in analyzing a statute under the gender-neutral approach.
245. See, eg., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980). In Wengler, the
Supreme Court struck down a provision of Missouri's workmen's compensation laws that de-
nied a widower death benefits unless he could show that he was mentally or physically inca-
pacitated or dependent on his wife's earnings; however, a widow was given death benefits
without having to make such a showing. Although the Court conceded that providing for
needy spouses was an "important government objective," the Court stated that the "discrimi-
natory means employed [did not] itself substantially servef" that end because the needs of
widows and widowers would just as effectively be met if the state granted "benefits to all
members of both classes or... [paid] benefits only to those members of either class who
c[ould] demonstrate their need." Id. at 151.
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trate not only that there is a relevant difference in the situation of the
biological father and the biological mother,246 but also that there is a
good reason for not burdening biological mothers, as well as biological
fathers. Assuming that the expressed legislative purpose of avoiding dis-
ruption of the family unit could be served by burdening both sexes-that
is, by giving neither sex the opportunity to disrupt the family unit-the
gender-neutral approach would require the state to show that the classifi-
cation advances some interest that would not be furthered by such a gen-
der-neutral statute.
The availability of such a gender-neutral alternative appears to be
the basis of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in R. McG. v. J.
W. 247 In that case, the court determined that the equal protection clause
was violated by a statutory classification which operated to deny the bio-
logical father standing to establish his paternity, while giving the biologi-
cal mother that right.24 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that
the classification did not substantially further the asserted governmental
end of protecting the family unit, because it permitted the biological
246. This showing is required under the similarly situated test. It could probably be met by
a showing that only mothers are within the family unit in which the child resides and thus,
arguably, are substantially less likely to bring an action which would disrupt the family unit.
247. 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980). The statutory provisions in question were the
Uniform Parentage Act, COLO. RPv. STAT. 1973 § 19-6-101 to 129 (1978 Rept. Vol. 8).
(These provisions are the same as those included in the Appendix to this Article.) Despite the
fact that he had no explicit statutory authority to bring a paternity action, the claiming natural
father in this case commenced such an action on behalf of himself and the minor child. His
complaint alleged that he was the natural father of the child and that he was the only man who
had sexual intercourse with the child's mother at the time of the child's conception, although
at the time of conception and birth, the child's mother was married to the presumed father.
His complaint further stated that the natural mother had admitted that he was the father, and
blood tests had been unable to exclude him as the natural father. The child's mother and
presumed father denied the claimant's alleged paternity and moved for summary judgment on
the ground that claimant lacked standing to sue under the UPA to bring the action.
The juvenile court granted the motion of the claiming natural father for serological testing
of himself and the presumed father prior to hearing the motion for summary judgment. The
results of these tests showed that the probability of the claiming natural father's paternity was
98.89%. The presumed father refused to comply with the request for an additional blood
sample when the testing laboratory was unable to isolate a sufficient number of lymphocytes
from his first blood sample. Affidavits filed by the claiming natural father in opposition to the
summary judgment stated, among other things, that the natural mother had acknowledged in a
sworn codicil to her will and in correspondence that he was the natural father of the child.
Furthermore, his affidavit stated that the child had visited with him almost daily. The child
was one and one-half years old and had developed a close relationship with the claimant's
three other children.
Irrespective of this evidence, the juvenile court rejected the claimant's constitutional argu-
ments and granted the summary judgment motion on behalf of the mother and the presumed
father.
248. R. McG., 200 Colo. at 350-53, 615 P.2d at 670-72.
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mother "to undo the state's interest in preserving family stability by seek-
ing both a declaration of non-paternity in the presumed father and a dec-
laration of paternity in the non-family natural father. ' 249 The court thus
implied that even when the biological mother and the biological father
were not "similarly-situated," because only the mother was within the
family unit, the classification violated the equal protection clause when it
did not also burden the mother. Since the asserted state interest could
also have been furthered by denying her the same rights which were de-
nied the father, the court determined that the classification could not be
upheld.
The Colorado court applied the rationale of the gender-neutral ap-
proach-that is, that a gender-based classification violates equal protec-
tion when there is a gender-neutral alternative available which would
also serve the asserted state interest. The court suggested that a state
statute that treats the sexes identically by burdening both biological par-
ents is an available and satisfactory gender-neutral alternative. Thus, the
state could have avoided the invalidation of the statute under the gender-
neutral approach only by showing that there was a good reason for not
also denying the mother the right to rebut the presumption.2 50 For ex-
ample, the state in this case could have claimed that there was a good
reason for giving the mother the right to rebut the legitimacy presump-
tion in order to ensure support for the child.25'
However, the Colorado court suggested that even if the state had
asserted its interest in providing support for the child, this would not
have been sufficient to justify the classification. The court indicated that
in order to justify the classification on that basis, the statute must condi-
tion the mother's right to bring an action for a declaration of paternity in
a non-spousal father upon the presumed father's desertion or non-sup-
port.252 The Colorado court thus implied that even if the state interest in
providing support for the child would justify a distinction between the
rights of the biological mother and biological father, the statute neverthe-
less violated the equal protection clause because it was not drawn as pre-
cisely as it could have been in order to achieve this state interest.
A second possible gender-neutral alternative is thus suggested by the
language of the Colorado Supreme Court. That alternative is a narrowly
249. Id. at 351, 615 P.2d at 670. In its equal protection analysis, the court conceded that
the governmental ends were important. However, the court stated that the real controversy in
this case concerned the means used to achieve those ends.
250. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text regarding the showing which the state
must make to override a gender-neutral alternative.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
252. R. McG., 200 Colo. at 351, 615 P.2d at 670-71.
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drawn classification which would serve the state interests as well as the
broad gender-based classification which discriminates between all men
and all women based on generalizations about the sexes. Such a gender-
neutral alternative was also suggested by the United States Supreme
Court in Caban v. Mohammed, 53 where the Court held that the gender-
based classification violated the equal protection clause. The statutory
provisions in question provided that an unwed father, unlike an unwed
mother, had no authority to veto the adoption of his child by withhold-
ing his consent.25 4 The unwed father could prevent his child's adoption
only by showing that the best interests of the child would not be served
by the adoption.
The Court stated that the proclaimed state interest of promoting the
adoption of illegitimate children could be protected in a way that did not
draw such an "inflexible gender-based distinction" as that made under
the relevant statutory provisions.255 The Court stated that the primary
reason that the statute would further the state interest of facilitating
adoption is the difficulty in locating and identifying an unwed father and
that this was not a concern when a father has had a relationship with the
child.2" 6 Therefore, the Court suggested that the statutory classification
could have been drawn more narrowly and still have fulfilled the state's
interest by providing that an adoption may proceed without the consent
of a parent when the parent has not come forward to establish a relation-
ship with the child or when the parent has abandoned the child.257 The
Court thus indicated that the statute could have been drawn on a gender-
neutral basis which would have furthered the state interests as well as
they would be served by the gender-based classification.25 8
The Court held that the statute violated the equal protection clause
253. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Caban.
254. See supra note 33.
255. Caban, 441 U.S. at 392.
256. Id. at 392-93.
257. Id. at 392.
258. In a footnote, the Court stated:
We do not suggest, of course, that the provision of § 111 making parental con-
sent unnecessary in cases of abandonment is the only constitutional mechanism avail-
able to New York for the protection of its interest in allowing the adoption of
illegitimate children when their natural fathers are not available to be consulted. In
reviewing the constitutionality of statutory classifications, "it is not the function of a
court 'to hypothesize independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible
altemative[s]' to the statutory scheme formulated by [the state] .... We note some
alternatives to the gender-based distinction of§ 111 only to emphasize that the state
interests asserted in support of the statutory classification could be protected through
numerous other mechanisms more closely attuned to those interests.
Id. at 393 n.13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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because the state had not shown that the different treatment given unwed
fathers and unwed mothers bore a substantial relationship to the state
interest in promoting the adoption of illegitimate children. The Court
stated that the statutory classification was "another example of 'over-
broad generalizations' in gender-based classifications. ' '259 The Court
concluded that "this undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers
and unwed fathers, applicable in all circumstances where adoption of a
child of theirs is at issue, does not bear a substantial relationship to the
State's asserted interest.
260
Similarly, an argument can be made regarding a statute that gives
all biological mothers the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy
and to establish paternity in a non-spousal father, while denying all bio-
logical fathers this right. If the asserted state interests are the protection
of the family unit and provision for support of the child, the statute can
be drawn more narrowly and still serve these interests. For example, the
statute might provide that a biological parent will be allowed these rights
if, and only if, it can be shown that: (1) the mother is no longer married
to the child's presumed father; or (2) the presumed father has abandoned
the child; or (3) the presumed father is no longer supporting the child.261
Such a statute would be gender-neutral and would protect both the
family unit (if there was one to protect) and the welfare of the child.
Since the statute could be drawn more narrowly and still serve the as-
serted state interests, the classification which distinguishes between all
biological fathers and all biological mothers should be deemed an over-
broad, gender-based classification. It is based on an undifferentiated dis-
tinction between biological mothers and biological fathers, and is
applicable in all cases, even when the state interests cannot be served.
Therefore, under the gender-neutral approach, this statute violates the
equal protection clause because a more narrowly drawn gender-neutral
alternative is available.
A third gender-neutral alternative to the statutory classification in
question would be a statute which provides for individualized hearings to
determine whether a biological parent should be given the right to rebut
the presumption of legitimacy and to establish paternity in a non-spousal
father. The statute would allow either parent to show that he or she
should be given this right and thus, would be gender-neutral. It would
also serve the asserted state interests because the hearing would deter-
259. Id. at 394.
260. Id.
261. This was suggested by the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in R. MEG., 200 Colo. at
351-52, 615 P.2d at 670-71.
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mine whether denial of this right is necessary to protect the family unit
or the child's welfare.
Such a gender-neutral alternative was employed by the Supreme
Court in Orr v. Orr26 2 to strike down an Alabama law that provided that
husbands, but not wives, could be required to pay alimony upon divorce.
In that case, the Court conceded that the governmental objectives were
both legitimate and sufficiently important.263 Moreover, the Court ex-
plicitly assumed that the situation of the sexes was significantly different
in relation to these objectives, 2 which would usually result in the classi-
fication being sustained under conventional equal protection analysis ap-
plying the "similarly situated" approach.265 However, the Court held
that because Alabama had already held individualized hearings at which
the parties' relative financial situations were considered, the state's pur-
pose could be fulfilled by making individualized determinations as to ali-
mony without having to rely upon broad gender-based classifications.266
The Court concluded that "[w]here, as here, the State's compensatory
and ameliorative purposes are as well served by a gender-neutral classifi-
cation as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the bag-
gage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on
the basis of sex.",
267
Accordingly, a statute providing for individualized hearings to de-
termine whether a biological parent should have the right to establish
paternity in a non-spousal father is an available gender-neutral alterna-
tive to a gender-based classification. Since the asserted state interests of
protecting the family unit and the child's welfare could be protected by
such a gender-neutral statute, the gender-based classification may be
deemed unnecessarily broad, thus violating equal protection.
The state, however, could assert that the gender-based classification
may be justified on the basis of the administrative savings which result
from not having a required hearing in every case. Indeed, the Court's
opinion in Orr stressed the fact that individualized hearings were already
required under the Alabama statute so there was "not even an adminis-
262. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
263. Id. at 280. The asserted government interests were: (1) assisting needy spouses; and
(2) reducing the disparity in economic conditions between men and women which resulted
from prior discrimination against women.
264. Id. at 281. The court stated that it would have reached the same decision "even if sex
were a reliable proxy for need, and even if the institution of marriage did discriminate against
women .... " Id.
265. See supra notes 204-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the similarly situated
approach.
266. Orr, 440 U.S. at 281-82.
267. Id. at 283.
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trative-convenience rationale" which justified use of a gender-based
classification.268
Yet, the Court in Orr also noted that even if the gender-neutral stat-
ute would result in more hearings than were required under the gender-
based classification, it would not justify the use of the classification. The
Court stated that even if "some administrative time and effort were con-
served" by the gender-based classification, "'[t]o give a mandatory pref-
erence to members of either sex.., merely to accomplish the elimination
of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.' "269 Thus, Orr implies
that a gender-neutral statute, even if that statute involved individualized
hearings not otherwise required, is a preferred alternative to a gender-
based classification. Moreover, a strong argument may be made that a
state's interest in administrative efficiency alone cannot justify the use of
an unnecessarily broad gender-based classification.270
In summary, if a court were to review the classification in question,
there are at least two effective gender-neutral alternatives which would
serve the asserted state interests equally as well as does the gender-based
classification. First, the statutes could be narrowly drawn so that both
sexes are burdened except in certain specified situations. For example,
the statutes could provide that a biological parent may have the right to
rebut the presumption of legitimacy only if it is shown that: (1) there is
no existing family unit to protect; or (2) the presumed father is not sup-
porting the child. Such a gender-neutral statute would protect the family
unit and provide support for the child.
A second gender-neutral alternative is a statute providing that every
biological parent has a right to a hearing to determine whether he or she
should be allowed to rebut the presumption of legitimacy under the cir-
cumstances of that case. Since the focus of the hearing would be a deter-
mination of whether rebuttal of the presumption could disrupt family
harmony or be detrimental to the child's well-being, such a gender-neu-
tral statute would serve the state interests of protecting the family unit
and the child's welfare. Although such a statute would result in addi-
tional costs to the state, a state's interest in administrative efficiency is
not as strong as other state interests. Since a hearing would protect not
268. Id. at 281.
269. Id. at 282 n.12 (citation omitted).
270. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). In Reed, the Court stated that although the
government's objective of reducing the workload of probate courts was "not without some
legitimacy," the use of the gender classification "merely to accomplish the elimination of hear-
ings on the merits" was impermissible. Id.
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only the private interests of a biological father but also the state interest
of protecting the child's welfare, such a statute is a preferred alternative
to the gender-based classification in question.
C. Conclusions Regarding Equal Protection
Statutes that give all biological mothers the right to rebut the pre-
sumption of legitimacy, while denying all biological fathers that right,
should be deemed to violate the equal protection clause. In making this
determination, courts should focus on whether the state interest of pro-
tecting the child's welfare is served by the classification in question. To
determine whether the classification is "substantially related" to the pur-
pose of serving the child's welfare, it is necessary to examine the facts of
the individual case.
Although the biological parents are not usually "similarly situated"
in that the biological mother is within the family unit and the biological
father is not, this is not sufficient justification for denying biological fa-
thers the right to establish their paternity in all cases. Since this differ-
ence in the position of biological mothers and biological fathers is itself a
distinction created by the state, the state should at least have to show
that the statute could not be designed in a gender-neutral manner and
still serve the child's welfare.
It is possible for a statute to be designed to compel consideration of
the child's welfare in each case by: (1) limiting the right of any parent to
rebut the presumption of legitimacy to specific instances in which it
would be in the child's best interests; or (2) requiring a hearing in every
case in which a parent seeks to rebut the presumption. Since the statute
could be designed in a gender-neutral fashion which would take into ac-
count the facts of each case, a classification distinguishing between all
biological mothers and all biological fathers is unnecessarily broad.
Therefore, in consideration of all the interests involved in such cases, and
specifically in consideration of the child's welfare, a court should apply
the gender-neutral approach to a review of the statutory classification in
question and hold that such classifications are unconstitutional as viola-
tive of the equal protection clause.
III. CONCLUSION
Statutes construed to deny all biological fathers the right to rebut
the presumption of legitimacy and to establish their paternity, while giv-
ing all biological mothers this right, should be held unconstitutional on
their face because they violate the due process clause and/or the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In analyzing the consti-
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tutionality of such statutes under either the due process clause or the
equal protection clause, there are two primary considerations.
First, all biological parents should have a right to establish their
parentage and thus obtain an opportunity to develop a relationship with
their children. This right to an opportunity to form a parent-child rela-
tionship should not depend on the sex of the parent or the marital status
of the parents at the time of the child's birth. However, if a parent does
not seize the opportunity to establish parentage and develop a significant
relationship with his or her child, or if a parent subsequently abuses or
neglects that relationship, then the parent may lose the right to maintain
that relationship.
Second, no biological parent should be deprived of the right to es-
tablish parentage and develop a relationship with his or her child unless
the state shows that there are overriding state interests served by denying
the parent this right. In this regard, the only state interest which should
be deemed of sufficient value to override the opportunity interest of the
biological parent is the welfare of the child. Clearly, administrative effi-
ciency should not be a sufficient state interest to deny a parent this right.
Assuming that the state's interest in the child's welfare is the only
state interest which may outweigh the right of a biological parent to an
opportunity to develop a relationship with his or her child, the appropri-
ate consideration is whether statutes that deny all biological fathers the
right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy and establish their parentage
serve the state interest of protecting the child's welfare. Clearly, it is
impossible to determine whether such statutes serve the child's welfare
without examing the facts of the individual case. In some cases, a con-
clusive presumption may serve to protect family harmony and thereby
serve the child's welfare. In other cases, there may be no family unit to
protect or the child may have no emotional or financial relationship with
the presumed father and the child's interests may best be served by estab-
lishing a relationship with the biological father. Thus, it is necessary to
examine the circumstances in each case to determine what is in the best
interests of the child.
The only way in which a court can consider the facts of each case is
through a hearing. Statutes that require a hearing when either biological
parent seeks the right to rebut the presumption of legitimacy would meet
the requirements of due process and equal protection. The only loss to
the state would be the administrative effort of having a hearing in each
case. In states such as California, where a hearing is required to deter-
mine the constitutionality of the statute as applied to the facts in every
case, the marginal loss of administrative efficiency would be the require-
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ment of additional hearings when mothers seek to rebut the presumption.
In states that do not presently require hearings, the interest in adminis-
trative efficiency should not be deemed to outweigh the more important
interests that would be served by requiring a hearing in each case.
Not only do these hearings protect the biological father's interest,
they protect the child's interest by establishing the welfare of the child as
the deciding factor in determining whether the paternity of the biological
father should be legally established. Since the child's welfare is, and
should be, the major state interest, such statutes would better serve not
only the father's interest but also the interests of the state.
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APPENDIX
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 587 (1979). The relevant
sections read as follows:
Section 1. [Parent and Child Relationship Defined]
As used in this Act, "parent and child relationship" means the legal
relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents
incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties,
and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the
father and child relationship.
Section 2. [Relationship Not Dependent on Marriage]
The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and
to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
Section 3. [How Parent and Child Relationship Established]
The parent and child relationship between a child and
(1) The natural mother may be established by proof of her
having given birth to the child, or under this Act;
(2) the natural father may be established under this Act;
Section 4. [Presumption of Paternity]
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been mar-
ried to each other and the child is born during the marriage,. .
(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives
the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural
child; or
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing
filed with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau], which
shall promptly inform the mother of the filing of the acknowledg-
ment, and she does not dispute the acknowledgment within a rea-
sonable time after being informed thereof, in a writing filed with the
[appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau].
Section 6. [Determination of Father and Child Relationship; Who May
Bring Action; When Action May Be Brought]
(a) A child, his natural mother, or a man presumed to be his father
under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a), may bring an action
(1) at any time for the purpose of declaring the existence of
the father and child relationship presumed under Paragraph (1), (2),
or (3) of Section 4(a); or
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(2) for the purpose of declaring the non-existence of the father
and child relationship presumed under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of
Section 4(a) only if the action is brought within a reasonable time
after obtaining knowledge of relevant facts, but in no event later
than [five] years after the child's birth. After the presumption has
been rebutted, paternity of the child by another man may be deter-
mined in the same action, if he has been made a party.
(b) Any interested party may bring an action at any time for the
purpose of determining the existence or non-existence of the father and
child relationship presumed under Paragraph (4) or (5) of Section 4(a).
(c) An action to determine the existence of the father and child
relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed father under
Section 4 may be brought by the child, the mother or personal represen-
tative of the child, the [appropriate state agency], the personal represen-
tative or a parent of the mother if the mother has died, a man alleged or
alleging himself to be the father, or the personal representative or a par-
ent of the alleged father if the alleged father has died or is a minor.
Each of the sixteen states that has adopted the Uniform Parentage
Act has its own modified version. 9A U.L.A. 581 (1979).
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